

CURRENT HISTORY

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THE MIDDLE EAST, 1992

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

The reverberations of the Persian Gulf war continue to be felt throughout the Middle East. The United States, which engineered Iraq's military defeat, has used its leverage from that success to convene a multilateral Middle East peace conference. While the initial conference was a show of rhetorical belligerency, the follow-up bilateral conference, scheduled for last December in Washington, D.C., may mark the beginning of constructive dialogue. Many of the issues that will be part of the dialogue are discussed in this month's *Current History*.

Articles in this issue also examine the two principals in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Kuwait and Iraq, and find that even though the war unsettled the political foundations of both countries, their rulers remain firmly in power. The war also challenged the Palestinians, and has led to a new pragmatism toward Israel among Palestinians in the occupied territories and their growing involvement in negotiations to end Israeli occupation.

Whether the democratic wave sweeping Africa, Latin America, and Europe has begun to reach the Middle East is the focus of Augustus Richard Norton's article. Norton is cautiously optimistic that Arab states can gradually move toward democracy, citing the experiences of Egypt and Algeria as evidence—but he tempers his optimism with an assessment of the regressive policies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

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The convening of a Middle East peace conference in late October was the culminating event in the Bush administration's diplomatic maneuvering after the Persian Gulf war. As Adeed Dawisha notes, "The peace conference was not the end but the beginning of a long and hazardous journey. The mistrust and suspicion among the participants were so great that the road to peace will be arduous, at times painful and full of frustration. Failure is possible at every stage. . . . The months to come will prove a singular test of the Bush administration's willingness to stay the course."

The United States in the Middle East: The Gulf War and Its Aftermath

BY ADEED DAWISHA

The king is dead. Long live the king." This was hardly the kind of clarion call the administration of United States President George Bush or the American public wanted to hear in the wake of the Persian Gulf war. "Baghdad's Dictator"—as Bush continued to call Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein—had emerged from the war not just defeated but bloodied and humiliated. His much vaunted army devastated, and his economy in shambles, Saddam would surely be headed for a quick and ignominious exit from Iraq's political scene. That was the conventional wisdom in early March 1991: the king was dead. Or so it seemed.

But in the fall of 1991, Saddam, his confidence apparently restored, was still in power, ruling over the hapless Iraqi people in a way that suggested little had changed. Although he was careful not to push the United States too far, neither did he seem ready to submit to "international will." Indeed, as the days passed, Saddam grew more defiant, intent on showing the world, as well as the Iraqi people, that he was back at the helm, and that news of his death was greatly exaggerated.

In Washington the debate that followed the war took the gloss off Bush's military triumph, particularly after it

was revealed that General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of United States forces in the Gulf, had preferred to continue the war effort, presumably until Saddam's demise. Bush's decision to call a cease-fire on February 27 was increasingly characterized as having been "too hasty."

SADDAM'S RESILIENCE

"Why did the allied forces stop short of ridding Iraq and the world of Saddam Hussein?" This question dominated the American political debate after Bush's unilateral announcement of a cease-fire. And when major insurrections in March by the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiites in southern Iraq were ruthlessly suppressed by the remnants of Saddam's supposedly "devastated army," many came to believe that with its cease-fire announcement the White House had lost its best, and perhaps only, opportunity to overthrow Iraq's "dictator."

Bush and members of his administration insisted that they had done the right thing. First, they argued, none of the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions issued after Iraq's August 1990 invasion sanctioned interference in Iraq's internal affairs. The objectives of the resolutions were Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty. The resolutions could justify the destruction of Iraq's offensive capability, even its economic and industrial infrastructure. But hunting down Saddam himself was outside the language of the resolutions, and any such action would have

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quickly lost international, especially Arab, support and would have undermined the international coalition that Bush had so painstakingly built.

Administration officials further argued that forcibly removing Saddam from power would have been a logistical nightmare, entailing a military thrust as far as Baghdad and engaging some of the Iraqi leader's best-equipped and most loyal troops. The allied forces would have had to hunt Hussein down at immense risk. Once they had captured him and eliminated his government, the allied troops would have had to stay long enough to put another government in place—and that is when the real problems would have begun. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney expressed this apprehension:

What kind of government? Should it be a Sunni government or Shi'a government or a Kurdish government or Ba'athist regime? Or maybe we want to bring in some of the Islamic fundamentalists? How long would we have had to stay in Baghdad to keep that government in place? What would happen to the government once U.S. forces withdrew? How many casualties should the United States accept in that effort to try to create clarity and stability in a situation that is inherently unstable?¹

Cheney's view suggests another reason for American reluctance to eliminate Saddam. Administration officials were apparently convinced that one of two outcomes, neither of them attractive, would follow Saddam's demise. The first would be either a Baathist or a military regime. In other words, the ruling elite that had participated in the invasion of Kuwait and the war against the United States would remain in power. Administration officials knew that would not be tolerated by the American public.

The second outcome would be a balkanization of the Iraqi state into three conflicting areas: Kurdish in the north, Shiite in the south, and Sunni in the center. The northern Kurdish region would destabilize the large Kurdish minorities in Iran, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Syria. In the south, the Shiites could look to their co-religionists in Iran for protection, a state of affairs that would not only threaten American strategic interests, but would also be unacceptable to the Kuwaitis and Saudis.

Observers in the Middle East ascribed ulterior motives to America's reluctance to remove Saddam Hussein from power. One argument pointed to the Security Council's resolutions demanding that Iraq pay war reparations. Indeed, on August 15, 1991, the Council voted to allow Iraq to sell \$1.6-billion worth of oil, but with

the stipulation that 30 percent of the income from the sale would be set aside for reparations. Those who argued this said that if Saddam were replaced with a compliant and democratic regime, then the allies of the United States, notably Kuwait, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, would find it more difficult to demand reparations from Iraq.

Ulterior motives notwithstanding, it was also suggested that the White House overestimated Hussein's vulnerability and underestimated his instinct for, and power of, survival. Certainly, the administration could be excused for thinking that his days were numbered as his humiliated army began to return to Baghdad. Few other dictators had survived such a devastating defeat.

America's Arab allies shared this perception. Most Arab observers thought Hussein would not last more than six months. Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, the commander of the Arab coalition forces and the son of Saudi Arabia's defense minister, gave Iraq's leader only 40 days, and repeated this prediction many times.

The insurrections that erupted in early March in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north seemed to confirm expectations that Saddam would be overthrown from within, either through the insurrection or by elements of his own ruling circle. But Saddam was able to suppress the rebellions with surprising ease. In the cities of southern Iraq, thousands of Shiite rebels were killed. In the north the defeat of the Kurdish insurrection was so complete, and the fear of Saddam's retribution so pervasive, that by early April more than one and a half million Kurds had fled their homes for the Turkish and Iranian borders. Hussein's troops might not have matched the coalition's superior technology, but they could still easily suppress any uprising within Iraq.

With Western hopes for a quick overthrow of Iraq's leader dashed, Bush decided on April 16 to pursue British Prime Minister John Major's suggestion to establish "safe havens" for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Bush announced that American, British, and French troops would build and protect several interim refugee camps for the Kurds in the flatlands of northern Iraq. When asked whether this would constitute an infringement of Iraqi sovereignty, Bush replied that his decision was consistent with Security Council Resolution 688, which approved the establishment of safe havens for the Kurdish refugees. Four days later, United States marines took control of Zakho, nine miles south of the Iraqi-Turkish border, and on May 2, American, British, French, and Dutch troops extended the protected zone beyond Amadiya, expelling virtually all Iraqi troops from an area in the north of Iraq that covered approximately 15,000 square miles.

While this operation looked like yet another blow to Saddam's prestige and credibility, by early May he had successfully consolidated his position and forcefully rallied his troops, using them effectively—and brutally—against opposition forces. By now, the Bush adminis-

¹*The Sorel Symposium: American Strategy after the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 45.

tration's expectations of Saddam's early demise had dimmed considerably.

In the summer and fall of 1991, the United States and the UN Security Council encountered a revived and increasingly defiant Saddam. Iraqi authorities constantly harassed inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who had been dispatched by the UN to Baghdad to check on Iraqi nuclear facilities in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Twice in June, IAEA inspectors were fired on as they tried to check military compounds for nuclear devices. And in September, when the inspectors discovered a large cache of documents relating to Iraq's secret development of nuclear weapons and missiles, Iraqi guards prevented them from removing the documents and detained the inspectors at the site for a few days. This incident occurred while Bush was addressing the UN General Assembly. He reminded the international community that "Saddam's contempt for UN resolutions. . . continues even as I speak," and then urged the UN members "not to compromise for a moment in seeing that Iraq destroys all of its weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them."

The United States president's tough words reflected his mounting frustration at Hussein's consolidation of power, and the inability of the United States to do much about it. If the president had hoped that Iraq's summary defeat would be a salutary lesson for Hussein, Iraqi action in the fall of 1991 proved that to be an illusion. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater admitted that Saddam Hussein simply had not "got the message." He added that "the history of dealing with Saddam Hussein is, you lose a lot of money betting he will get the message and follow through before it's too late."

A NEW PRESENCE IN THE GULF

Delivering the keynote address at a Washington Institute for Near East Policy symposium in late April, Defense Secretary Cheney enunciated the strategic goal of United States policy in the Gulf:

The president has made it clear that we are not interested in a permanent, or long-term United States ground presence. . . . But we are interested in [an] enhanced naval presence. We think we can do that safely. . . . We think there is a greater receptivity on the part of our friends in that part of the world to an occasional United States presence, a tactical fighter squadron, for example, deployed from time to time on a temporary basis to work out exercises jointly with our friends in the region; pre-positioned equipment, both for air and ground forces; those kinds of arrangements we think make

sense, [and would] remind and reassure everyone of our commitment.²

In the question-and-answer session that followed his address, Cheney explained the administration's rationale for wanting a presence in the Gulf. He said that

given the enormous resources that exist in that part of the world, and given the fact that those resources are in decline elsewhere, the value of those resources is only going to rise in the years ahead, and the United States and our major partners cannot afford to have those resources controlled by somebody who is fundamentally hostile to our interests.³

Never before, certainly not before the Gulf war, had America's desire for a presence in the area been articulated so publicly and forthrightly. In the past, United States officials shied away from such public pronouncements because it was always assumed that any American military presence would destabilize the indigenous regimes. It would be the ultimate proof that these regimes, autocratic and archaic, had no domestic legitimacy; that their survival could only be guaranteed by outside powers. The presence of white, Christian soldiers on Arab lands, it was argued, would constitute an affront to Islam and Arabism that would ultimately undermine the stability of the very regimes an American presence was meant to safeguard.

Because of the war, people in the countries of the Persian Gulf had begun to accept the presence of foreigners in their midst. This attitudinal change was most dramatic in Kuwait, but less so in Saudi Arabia, where Islam's holiest shrines are located. The almost universal realization by the Gulf populations that, without these foreign men and women, they stood little chance of frustrating Iraqi ambitions meant that the idea of an American presence was no longer considered egregious or necessarily destabilizing.

On a visit to the Gulf in May, Cheney told reporters that he had reached "broad agreement" with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—on the storage of United States military equipment in the region, and on joint military exercises involving American troops. Cheney announced that detailed arrangements between the United States military and each Gulf state were to be negotiated in the next months.

In late October, however, press reports suggested that Saudi officials had balked at the size of the proposed American equipment stockpile in their country. The Defense Department had planned to leave behind in the desert kingdom a division's worth of tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and other military equipment. The Saudis reportedly considered this stockpile, with its

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 53.

attendant personnel, unnecessarily large and too visible. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials dismissed suggestions of an impasse between the two allies. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul D. Wolfowitz insisted that the United States and Saudi Arabia had "come a long way in agreeing in principle on the kinds of pre-positioning that we would both like to see out there."

Kuwait, however, had no such qualms about a security arrangement with the superpower that had restored its sovereignty. In early September, Kuwait and the United States publicly signed a 10-year security pact that allowed the United States to stockpile equipment and conduct military exercises in Kuwait. Reports also circulated that Kuwait's ruling family had "asked both the United States and the United Kingdom to establish permanent military presences in the Gulf region. . . . The U.K. reportedly had turned down the Kuwaiti request."⁴

In addition, the Bush administration followed an aggressive policy of arms sales to the region, brushing aside loud objections from Congress. On May 23, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, echoing UN and international concerns, approved legislation calling for an arms sales moratorium in the Middle East as part of the 1992–1993 foreign aid authorization bill. Two weeks later the White House announced that it intended to sell 20 Apache attack helicopters to the United Arab Emirates and 8 to Bahrain. By law, Congress had 30 days to oppose the sale. But despite initial congressional opposition, the waiting period expired and the sale went through. Clearly, Congress was wary of challenging a popular president.

Pressing on their advantage, in late July administration officials announced arms packages to the Middle East totaling \$4 billion. For aircraft delivery bombs, cluster bombs, air-to-air missiles, and military vehicles, Saudi Arabia was to pay \$838 million. A Defense Department statement said that this Saudi arms sale was "consistent with the . . . stated policy of assisting friendly nations to provide for their own defense." Again there was widespread criticism in Congress of the Saudi sale, which was depicted as undermining international efforts to slow arms proliferation in the region. But here too, congressional opposition fizzled out in the face of presidential popularity, and the sale went through.

The president was far less assertive on the questions of democratization and human rights in the Gulf states. Between March and October 1991, the press and international organizations reported widespread abuses of

human rights in Kuwait. The New York-based Middle East Watch, a respected human rights organization, released a report on September 11 accusing the "highest level of the Kuwaiti government of flagrant human rights abuses. . . including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings." The report charged that "Kuwait's human rights conduct since liberation had been nothing short of deplorable."⁵ Yet on the few occasions when the president felt compelled to respond to the mounting criticism of Kuwait's human rights record, he seemed to excuse the behavior of the country and its emir.

Nor was the president especially concerned that Kuwait's ruling Sabah family dragged its feet on promises to democratize the political system—promises it made while in exile. Bush reminded his critics that the United States had fought the war not to institute democracy in Kuwait, but to liberate the country from Iraqi occupation.

Still, to many in Congress and among the American public, the president's attitude toward Kuwait seemed to be at odds with his desire to create a "new world order" that presumably would be based on the cherished American values of democracy and human rights. Many Americans were confused and angry that he did not show any willingness to promote these values in a country that owed its very existence to the United States.

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE

Timidity was hardly evident in the way the Bush administration pursued its objective of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The process began on March 6, when the president, addressing a joint session of Congress after the Gulf war ended, announced that a key challenge for United States policy in the Middle East was to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to be accomplished by Israel's release of occupied land in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel.

Five days later, in an effort to bolster the president's position, Secretary of State James Baker 3d traveled to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to explore the possibilities for peace. While in Israel, Baker met not only with Israeli government representatives but also with Palestinian representatives. He must have derived some initial encouragement from that meeting, because in the next seven months he visited the area seven more times. While the process was never easy—at times it looked futile—Baker and Bush persisted until October 18, when the secretary of state announced that an Arab-Israeli peace conference would take place in Madrid on October 30.⁶

How was Baker able to bring about this diplomatic coup? Why was he able to succeed where so many of his predecessors had so frustratingly failed? The answer lies in two major developments: the collapse of the Soviet empire and the American victory in the Gulf war.

It is worth remembering that, in the past, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had objected to a peace conference with Israel on the grounds that with its military superi-

⁴*Facts on File*, September 12, 1991, p. 682.

⁵*The Washington Post*, September 11, 1991, and October 2, 1991.

⁶For a cogent analysis of the background to these meetings, see Melvin A. Friedlander, *Conviction and Credence: US Policymaking in the Middle East* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), chapter 5.

ority, even hegemony, in the area, Israel would have little incentive to make concessions to the Arab states. Consequently, a peace conference would only yield total Arab capitulation to Israeli demands. Assad believed that the only way the Arab states could wring meaningful concessions from the Israelis was through strategic parity with the Jewish state. As long as the Soviet Union was willing and able to supply the Syrians with sophisticated military hardware, Assad could continue to hope for the day when Israel would become sufficiently intimidated by his military prowess to make the kind of concessions he desired. In the meantime, why should he take the risk of negotiating with a country that would steamroll its way through negotiations with weak and dispirited Arab states?

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire, Baker was able to convince Assad that whatever credibility the Syrian argument might have had in the past, it was no longer valid. Baker did not have to argue the point too strenuously. It had become clear that the Soviet Union's economic problems had made the former Communist superpower a virtual hostage to Western political will. Soviet behavior during the Gulf war confirmed that when push came to shove, the Soviet Union would quickly yield to the United States. Consequently, when Baker came to Damascus he encountered a new-found flexibility in the Syrian position.

The Gulf war also helped improve American-Syrian relations. Syria had sided with the allies during the crisis, and had actually participated in the war. Syria had its own reasons for doing so, not least of which was the intense personal rivalry between Assad and Saddam Hussein. The many months of close American-Syrian military and diplomatic cooperation during the crisis helped undo many of the psychological barriers to improved relations.

On the United States side, the war helped free Bush of the fear that had paralyzed most of his predecessors, namely, fear of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. With his popularity soaring after the war, Bush was able to take on the pro-Israel lobby in the United States in a way that would have been unthinkable one or two years earlier.

The situation came to a head in September 1991, when Bush asked Congress for a four-month delay in considering Israel's request for a \$10-billion loan guarantee to help resettle Soviet Jewish immigrants. The president and his secretary of state had been especially piqued by Israel's unrelenting settlement program in the West Bank in the face of continued American objections, and at a time when the secretary of state was conducting delicate negotiations with the Syrians and other Arabs in an effort to persuade them to attend a peace conference.

But Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Israeli government continued to press Congress to approve the loan guarantees despite Baker's private appeal to Shamir to delay consideration. Shamir was evidently convinced that Israel's allies in the American Jewish community and Congress would make the president see the futility of his

efforts. Indeed, Shamir's government was so confident of victory that it voted to include the first \$2 billion of the \$10 billion in American-backed loans in its 1992 budget even after Baker had informed Shamir that the administration was seeking a delay.

However, despite an intensive lobbying campaign in Congress, Israel's supporters had to concede defeat when it became apparent that the president was not going to budge, and that public opinion seemed solidly behind his position—a realization that undermined the resolve of many members of Congress who in the past had steadfastly voted in Israel's favor.

Bush's victory helped realize the efforts to convene a peace conference in two ways. First, it convinced Shamir and his hard-line government that their ability to influence congressional decisions to veto presidential actions had been reduced. Israel's government would thus become more susceptible to American pressure than before. Second, Bush's stand against the pro-Israel lobby helped to abate the age-old Arab suspicion that the United States was so beholden to Israel that it could not and would not act as an "honest broker." The new perception was clearly articulated by Assad in a television interview in which he said that he accepted the American proposals for a peace conference because he trusted Bush. Assad believed that Bush "was a man who was genuine about seeking peace."

The conference convened in Madrid on October 30. After the bluster of the introductory speeches, where well-established, maximalist positions were reiterated, the conference broke up into three sets of bilateral negotiations, in which the Israelis met face-to-face with the Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. When these discussions adjourned on November 4, no venue or dates were set for follow-up meetings, but there was general expectation that having brought the disputants this far, the United States would bring its weight to bear to convene a second set of bilateral meetings.

While little of substance was achieved in Madrid, the fact that these long-standing disputants sat across from each other at the table having discussions—even heated and bad-tempered discussions—was in itself a historic event. And it was obvious that, notwithstanding the joint sponsorship of the conference, it was primarily to the United States that the disputants played their respective tunes.

If the Madrid conference taught us anything, it simply confirmed what many had believed—that the peace conference was not the end but the beginning of a long and hazardous journey. The mistrust and suspicion among the participants were so great that the road to peace will be arduous, at times painful and full of frustration. Failure is possible at every stage. But if the process succeeds, it will become a glorious beginning to President Bush's "new world order." The months to come will prove a singular test of the Bush administration's willingness to stay the course. ■

"The Iraqi invasion and occupation was a horrible and costly experience for virtually everyone touched by it. Yet it was not unrelievedly bad. For the first time in more than a generation, Kuwaitis were called on to risk their lives and property, and they achieved substantial results."

Kuwait: The Morning After

BY MARY ANN TÉTREAULT

The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait last February and March by a United States-led coalition ended a seven-month national nightmare.* But the country Kuwaitis woke up to was filled with ironies. The best of their old lives—the stark beauty of the desert, the new seafront development where families had walked and played on cool evenings, the oil industry that generated the wealth on which their comfort rested—had been devastated, not only by the accidents of war but by deliberate Iraqi sabotage. The worst of their old lives—the insecurity that besets, in the words of Kuwaiti historian Hassan Ali al-Ebraheem, a "small state living in a bad neighborhood," and Kuwait's fumbling and increasingly autocratic regime—was restored to them seemingly intact.

The crisis divided the Kuwaitis into "insiders," those who endured the Iraqi invasion and occupation, and "outsiders," those who fled the country and then watched from safe havens. Perhaps because most members of the government were outsiders, insider experiences have been devalued and repressed. Unlike the progress on reconstruction of Kuwait's physical infrastructure, repair of the political community has barely begun, and it is doubtful that it will meet with the same success.

The August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion and the subsequent occupation of Kuwait destroyed the myth of Arab brotherhood, and with it many lives and billions of dollars in

property in Kuwait. Even though many Iraqi soldiers were reported to have been capriciously cruel rather than systematically vicious, the population was terrorized by arrests, torture, kidnapping, rape, and murder. Kuwaitis caught with weapons, leaflets, or other tokens of resistance were killed, sometimes in front of their families, who had been brought out to watch.

The invasion was about holding, looting, and terrorizing Kuwait—not its integration into Iraq. According to an official associated with Kuwait's reconstruction program, "The Iraqis stole everything that could be loaded onto a five-ton truck and carried it away. . . . automobiles, typewriters, telephones, computers, televisions, domestic appliances, furniture, and every other possible sort of movable possession." Stores, offices, private homes, and even hospitals were looted.

In the months before the invasion, Kuwait was producing about 2 million barrels a day of crude oil and refining 750,000 barrels daily—most of it for export—in its own high-tech refineries. Smashing the Kuwaiti oil industry was one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's primary goals. His army had more than five months to accomplish this, from the invasion to the beginning on January 17 of the Persian Gulf war to evict Iraqi forces. During their occupation, soldiers preset explosive charges at oil wells, pumping and storage facilities, and refineries, and mined the surrounding areas.

Detonation of these charges damaged 749 of Kuwait's 1,330 active oil and gas wells. About 650 of the damaged wells caught fire. Despite a slow start in putting out blazes and repairing equipment, limited oil production resumed at two onshore fields in June, while the Ahmadi refinery, the least damaged of Kuwait's three interlinked refining complexes, was restarted in August. By September about 30 firefighting teams from 11 countries were at work. The last fire was extinguished in early November, many months sooner than most experts had thought possible.

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*The author wishes to thank Connie Moray and Denise Wilman, and Karen Elliot House of *The Wall Street Journal* for their assistance on this article.

THE KUWAITI RESISTANCE

Before the invasion, the most frequently heard criticism of Kuwaitis was that they were lazy and incompe-

tent, dependent on the government and foreigners to do everything for them. But their ordeal under occupation revealed how much of this behavior had been socially constructed. After the invasion, Kuwaiti insiders rapidly established resistance groups whose activities went far beyond the paramilitary operations that Iraqi troops almost completely suppressed in three months. The groups organized mass demonstrations and held clandestine political meetings at mosques and *diwaniyyahs*.¹ Because the Iraqis were not concerned with providing for the population, the most important resistance activities related to keeping people alive: the acquisition and distribution of food and other necessities, garbage removal, the provision of medical care, and the dissemination of information.² Resistance workers were in danger of immediate execution if they were caught at any of these tasks.

Insiders lived very differently from the way most Kuwaitis had before the invasion. In the resistance, Kuwaitis from the middle and upper classes worked side by side with those of lower social status and with Palestinians and other foreigners. Age barriers, religious differences, and the separation by gender common in the societies of the Arabian peninsula were forgotten by those helping a population under siege; everyday life was democratized.

After the war insiders were vocal in their criticism of the Kuwaiti government; they had withstood all that Saddam could do to them, and no longer feared their own government. They pointed out official ineptitude in responding to Iraq's demands before the invasion: the poor strategy and performance of those in top positions, including the ministers of defense and the interior and the acting chief of staff, all three of whom were members of the ruling Sabah family; and the discounting of assessments by lower ranking officers of the military danger to Kuwait from Iraq. They decried the tight control of the news media that had left many ignorant of the scope of the threat facing them until it was too late either to flee or to defend themselves. The regime, however, simply ignored these criticisms.

DEMOLISHING THE RESISTANCE

Despite disenchantment with the government, both insiders and outsiders remained loyal to the ruling family, which for them symbolized their unity as a people and their 250-year history as a political community. No Kuwaiti quisling could be found to front for Iraq during

the occupation. After liberation the return of Kuwait's emir, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, was eagerly anticipated throughout the country.

However, the emir, who put off his return to liberated Kuwait for 15 days, chose not to mark his resumption of authority by reinstating Kuwait's social contract. In what seemed a clear renegeing on promises he had made at an October 1990 meeting of Kuwaiti exiles in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, the emir did not rescind his July 1986 suspension of the civil liberties provisions of the Kuwaiti constitution, nor did he recall the parliament, which he had closed at the same time. Instead, martial law was imposed, as the government-in-exile had announced it would be.

Martial law was defended as necessary for the disarming of unruly teenagers, former collaborators, and a feared fifth column of Iraqis masquerading as Kuwaitis. It was probably also aimed at resistance organizations like the Movement of the Second of August, whose members had vowed to remain armed until the government was purged of those they considered responsible for the debacle. Martial law failed to protect Kuwaiti opponents of the regime. Two of these, Hamad al-Jouan and Hussein al-Bani, were shot under suspicious circumstances; Jouan was seriously wounded and Bani was killed.

Domestic and foreign pressures for some movement toward democratization intensified in response to the shootings and to repeated disruptions of opposition political meetings. On June 2 the emir announced that parliamentary elections would be held in October 1992. However, a separate proclamation banned political meetings, and press censorship continued. In the meantime, the emir said that a national council, whose members had been chosen by extraconstitutional means the preceding summer, would meet to advise him and prepare for the coming elections. Although opposition leaders opposed the convening of the national council, the promise of elections and hints that women and naturalized Kuwaitis might be enfranchised in time to vote defused the domestic unrest. The crowds attending opposition rallies soon dwindled to a few hundred people.

RULE AS USUAL?

Kuwait's first postwar Cabinet was named in April 1991. It was widely condemned as unrepresentative and incompetent by critics from across the political spectrum. It included no one from the opposition or who had remained inside Kuwait during the occupation. The emir showed his contempt for insider concerns by retaining the interior and defense ministers in the Cabinet, though they were shuffled to less prominent positions. Khalid Sultan, a businessman and leader of an Islamist (Muslim fundamentalist) group, said the Cabinet "is politically unacceptable and management-wise it lacks what it takes to rebuild a broken country, from the

¹*Diwaniyyahs* are informal gatherings, generally of adult men, held regularly at the homes of prominent members of the community for purposes of discussion. The *diwaniyyah* is the most important public forum in Kuwaiti society.

²The organization and activities of the resistance are detailed in Shafeeq Ghabra, "The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (London), vol. 20, no. 2 (Winter 1991), and in press accounts.

prime minister down." The former minister of planning in the Cabinet-in-exile, Suleiman Mutawa, found the ruler's choices incomprehensible: "Nobody wants the al-Sabah[s] out, so what are they worried about? What prevents them from bringing in good managers?"

These questions penetrate to the heart of the domestic malaise that has afflicted Kuwait for nearly a decade. Good managers could become rivals of the ruling family and challenge what before the invasion had been the Sabah family's increasingly exclusive hold on Kuwait's government, economy, and society. This explains why, despite the proven competence of resistance organizations, the government denied insiders a formal role in reconstruction, even during the first few weeks after liberation, when food and fuel shortages threatened while truckloads of supplies rotted because outsiders were unable to distribute them.

But squeezing out potential rivals of the ruling family is only one mechanism in the regime's arsenal of social controls. University of Michigan political scientist Jill Crystal points to two others: the purchase of citizen support through the provision of material benefits, especially to those who are the most compliant, and pitting social groups against one another, especially citizens against foreign workers but also citizens against citizens.³

The regime's role as paternalistic dispenser of benefits dates to the creation of Kuwait's welfare state in the 1950s. Every social group in the country felt the regime's largesse, even wealthy merchants, the traditional antagonists of the ruling family. For them, the most important benefits included profits from the sale of land to the government at vastly inflated prices, and the requirement in the 1960 Law of Commercial Companies that all companies operating in Kuwait be at least 51 percent Kuwaiti-owned. For the masses and the elite in Kuwait, government benefits included free housing, utilities, education, and health care, and subsidized food staples and petroleum products.

After the Iraqi invasion the living expenses of outsiders were paid by the government, and each outsider received a lump-sum payment of \$1,720. After liberation insiders received their salaries, even though most had refused to work as part of the resistance-organized noncompliance with the occupation; expatriate employees, most of whom had remained in their positions, did not receive back pay because, the government said, they had worked for the occupiers. Both Kuwaitis and non-

Kuwaitis have been assured that the money they had in Kuwaiti banks at the time of the invasion will be returned, and all Kuwaiti foreign liabilities, private and public, have also been guaranteed by the government. Estimates of the cost of the salaries and support payments range from \$3 billion to \$4 billion, a substantial sum for a country in Kuwait's present financial position but still manageable.

If the claims of foreigners living in Kuwait are set aside, these measures seem reasonable. But other proposed benefits are excessive and unfair—even perverse—in their likely effects. In a surprise move, the emir announced in April that the debts of Kuwaiti insiders held by Kuwaiti banks—primarily mortgages and consumer loans amounting to some \$5 billion—would be forgiven by the state. This was a boon to those with large debts but small comfort to citizens who had already repaid their mortgages or had no personal debt. Even as reparations this plan is flawed because it does not distinguish between those who suffered large losses and those who lost relatively little under the occupation. A similarly constructed bailout of Kuwaiti commercial banks and businesses, which would cost about \$17.5 billion, may be adopted as well.

FOREIGNERS AS SCAPEGOATS

The exclusion of foreign workers living in Kuwait from salary supports and the proposed bailouts are examples of the third major method used by the regime to strengthen its hand against civil society. Public criticism after liberation pushed the government to try even harder to build support for itself and to reunite the country; one way it did this was to make foreigners scapegoats.

At the second conference of the government-in-exile, held in January 1991 in Jiddah, government spokesmen "harp[ed] on the theme that Kuwaiti society had been infiltrated by agents provocateurs, and that the loyalties of Palestinians resident in Kuwait were suspect and needed to be determined."⁴ After liberation, the government rounded up foreigners. Because the foreigners and bedouns (people without citizenship papers, many of them desert nomads) who had made up the majority of Kuwait's police force had been deprived of their jobs, the roundup depended on the services of untrained and often thuggish young Kuwaitis.

Non-Kuwaiti Arabs, Asians, and bedouns were beaten, kidnapped, murdered, or forced to leave the country. Some were arrested and tried as collaborators. Police were implicated in most cases of brutality against foreigners, but private citizens were also reported to have been involved. On April 4, Salim Mukhtar, a prominent Palestinian, was shot under circumstances similar to those surrounding the shooting of Hamad al-Jouan; at least one report attributed the killings to "royal death squads."⁵ United States Army officers investigating human rights abuses reported that direct evidence had

³See Jill Crystal, *Oil, Politics, and the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁴The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Iraq Country Report*, No. 1 (1991), p. 7.

⁵The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Iraq Country Report*, No. 2 (1991), p. 12.

been found linking some cases to the ruling family, including the son of the crown prince.

There was little outcry by Kuwaitis against these human rights violations. Insiders especially had a great deal of pent-up anger and a desire to pay back in kind the brutal treatment that the Iraqis and collaborators had inflicted on them and their families.

In the last days of the occupation thousands of Kuwaitis, including children, were trucked to Iraq. (As of late September, some 300 Kuwaiti children were still unaccounted for, while more than 1,500 Kuwaiti adults and 400 adults of other nationalities who had been living in Kuwait continued to be held in Iraq.)

But Kuwait's treatment of foreign nationals and the kangaroo-court aspects of the postwar trials of accused collaborators provoked an international outcry. Amnesty International, which only a few months earlier had condemned the treatment of Kuwaitis by their Iraqi occupiers, now condemned Kuwaiti actions. In response to pressures from human rights organizations and the United States, in late June 1991 the Kuwaiti government announced that all those who had been given the death penalty for collaboration would have their sentences commuted. Eventually the Red Cross was permitted to visit detainees and to observe expulsions from the country. However, as late as October reports that detainees were being beaten continued to surface in the press.

RINGMASTERS AND SIDESHOWS

Most of the postwar reconstruction of Kuwait has concentrated on rebuilding the physical plant and infrastructure, while little attention has been given to political reconstruction and almost none to the Kuwaiti people's emotional and moral rehabilitation. In one sense this reflects Kuwait's status as a sideshow in the process preoccupying most world leaders participating in "the crisis in the Gulf"—that is, the decay of the cold war international order and the new distribution of world power. Kuwait's liberation was an exercise in great-power military logistics and public relations, with powers and pretenders to power vying for prestige. The coalition that liberated Kuwait had made no prior plans regarding the country's postwar internal or external security, leaving its disoriented leaders responsible for everything from mine clearing to the development and implementation of a new defense strategy.

The interest of the Persian Gulf war's ringmasters in rebuilding Kuwait seems sadly limited, centering mainly on how much Kuwait can pay for past and future services. Pledges and payments to Kuwait's liberators started even before hostilities commenced. Kuwait's government-in-exile pledged \$5 billion to the United States in support of the military buildup in the region after the invasion; for the war itself, Kuwait pledged an additional \$13.5 billion to the United States and \$6 billion to other countries of the coalition. Kuwait's foreign aid agency, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development,

wrote off all outstanding loans to coalition members Egypt and Syria, and in December granted them \$175 million in new loans. Kuwait also agreed to support other activities in Egypt, offering as much as \$650 million in additional funds.

The fight over who would be awarded the reconstruction contracts was even more crass. It was widely believed after liberation that a deal had been negotiated that would allocate fixed percentages of the value of contracts to prominent coalition members, chiefly the United States. The most severe criticism on the allocation of contracts came from the Arab governments, particularly Egypt's. Egypt did not receive any contracts in the spring of 1991 and was also angered at the treatment of Egyptian guest workers in Kuwait. Egyptians, like those from other countries that had sided with Iraq during the crisis, lost their jobs in large numbers, were harassed, deported, denied salaries, and even killed. In May, Egypt unilaterally decided to pull all its troops out of Kuwait, confirming the deterioration in relations between the two countries and derailing plans for a postwar security arrangement for Kuwait based on an Egyptian and Syrian troop presence. In a belated attempt to repair the relationship, the Kuwaiti government agreed to honor the labor contracts of all Egyptian workers, permitting more than 80,000 of them to return to Kuwait and buying out the contracts of the others under the terms awarded to retirees. It is also reported to have awarded some contracts to Egyptian companies.

Because more money will probably be used to replace looted property than to rebuild (except in the oil industry), estimates of reconstruction costs for Kuwait have been revised downward, from more than \$100 billion to a more moderate \$30 billion. For the ringmasters this is a great disappointment. For Kuwait it is still a substantial sum of money, most of which will leave the country, since virtually everything must be replaced or rebuilt using materials, equipment, and even workers from abroad.

DEFINING KUWAIT'S IDENTITY

The number and status of foreign workers to be allowed into Kuwait is a bellwether issue. For several years the government has wanted to cut back the number of foreign residents. At the last official census, conducted in 1985, 60 percent of Kuwait's population was non-Kuwaiti. There were many announcements last March and April that the foreign population would be reduced as a security measure to ensure that Kuwaitis would never again be a minority in their own country; the wholesale deportation of Palestinians and other foreign workers was justified on that basis.

Yet even here the regime is torn between its own and the national interest. It makes pronouncements on reducing the number of foreign workers but encourages Kuwaitis to return to their pre-invasion habits and a lifestyle based on the widespread use of domestic ser-

vants. The Kuwaiti private sector, interested in low costs and labor productivity, has also made its preference for foreign workers clear. Midway through the autumn of 1991, the government had not yet set official limits on guest workers, nor was there any mechanism to allocate them to the jobs where they were most needed.

Kuwaitis are asking their government for more than servants and laborers. In July members of the national council—almost two-thirds of whom are from non-elite backgrounds—advised the emir to give each Kuwaiti family \$69,000, half of which would be an outright gift and the remainder a long-term, interest-free loan. This would require almost \$10 billion and, more problematic for Kuwait's long-term prospects, would reinforce the welfare syndrome that before the invasion had kept Kuwaitis dependent on the government and scorned by their neighbors.

The Iraqi invasion and occupation was a horrible and costly experience for virtually everyone touched by it. Yet it was not unrelievedly bad. For the first time in more than a generation, Kuwaitis were called on to risk their lives and property, and they achieved substantial results. Insiders put their efforts into resisting their occupiers; many outsiders devoted themselves to keeping their country's plight before the world community, to fighting for liberation, and, after returning to Kuwait, to rebuilding their society.

The government also rose to the occasion in many ways. It showed its best side in the fall of 1990, when the prospects of an early end to the crisis dimmed with each passing day. The emir's speech at the October 1990 meeting in Jiddah inspired Kuwaitis from across the political spectrum to steel themselves against the terrors of occupation and war. It was not until liberation was almost at hand that the regime reverted to its autocratic and manipulative ways, foreshadowing the ugly and contentious period under martial law that lasted from February 28 to June 26.

The setting of an October 1992 date for parliamentary elections provides time for Kuwait's government and people to reflect on the kind of country they want and to mobilize the resources they will need to create it. The unique Reserve Fund for Future Generations—which, although supposed to remain untouched until 2010, financed the government-in-exile, Kuwait's share of the liberation costs, and reconstruction—could be further plundered by the regime to finance giveaways to buy popular support, at least for a while.

But the regime could choose differently. It could lead the country to constitutional government, requiring not only power sharing among elites but burden sharing across the entire population. Opposition leaders could fight among themselves, vying for power, prestige, and the substantial economic rewards the regime offers the acquiescent. Or they could continue what they began under domestic repression and subsequent occupation—building bridges between the various social groups that the regime worked so hard to divide. For political as well as moral reasons, they must overcome their religious prejudices and include Kuwait's large Shi'ite Muslim minority as full participants in any expanded political life.

These choices must be made in an extremely insecure environment. Kuwait's neighbors have opposed its democratization since the 1930s; one of them, Iraq, remains enough of a threat to allow the regime to justify domestic repression for the sake of national security. The ringmasters who benefited from the Persian Gulf war and who buy Kuwaiti oil must pay some of the bills for rebuilding the country and must cooperate in a security regime that permits Kuwait to solve domestic problems in its own way.

Before the war Kuwait shared many of the attractive characteristics of the ancient Greek city-states, especially the quality of what political philosopher Hannah Arendt would describe as its "public space"; the *diwaniyyahs* allowed widespread and enthusiastic participation in politics. The country also shared some of the unattractive characteristics of those ancient communities: discrimination against foreigners, second-class status for women, and disdain for hard work and expertise. Kuwaitis are having second thoughts about at least some of these in light of what they have learned about themselves and the world in the past year and a half. It is important that these lessons be remembered and built on.

The future shape of Kuwaiti society will depend on a strong commitment to democratization and human rights in Kuwait by the United Nations and the countries of the coalition that liberated it. This must be coupled with their acceptance of shared responsibility in the creation of security arrangements that permit the countries of the Gulf region not only to survive but to flourish. And the outlines of that future Kuwait will also depend on the outcome of the current struggle between insiders and outsiders to define Kuwait. ■

"Iraq succumbed to hubris in 1990: Saddam Hussein hoped to make his country rich beyond belief and infinitely more powerful by incorporating Kuwait. Then he promised that the war for Kuwait would be 'the mother of all battles,' but it turned out to be 'the mother of all defeats.' . . . [O]ne of the most highly developed countries in the Middle East has been crippled and left with limited sovereignty and a limited regional and international role."

Iraq, the Pariah State

BY AHMED HASHIM

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and its subsequent ejection from the emirate were watershed events in Iraq's modern history. The invasion precipitated the world's first post-cold war crisis and united almost the entire international community against Iraq. In the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the Western powers (Britain, France, and the United States) led the opposition to Iraq on the diplomatic front and helped push through a series of Security Council resolutions condemning the invasion and imposing trade sanctions.*

Activity was not limited to the diplomatic front. Fearing an Iraqi attack, Saudi Arabia requested United States military aid, which began to arrive on August 7. This set the stage for a massive deployment of United States forces to the region, soon joined by smaller contingents from Britain, France, Egypt, Syria, and many other countries to form a formidable anti-Iraq international coalition. On November 29 the UN Security Council authorized this coalition to use "all necessary means"—including force—to eject Iraq from Kuwait on or after January 15, 1991.

As the crisis continued, the coalition's goals were increasingly defined by the United States. These included the defense of Saudi Arabia; Iraq's immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait;

and the restoration of security and stability to the Persian Gulf. Attempts by France, Iran, the Soviet Union, and others to reach a negotiated settlement stalled because of United States insistence on an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, and because Iraq insisted that Kuwait was Iraqi territory and that the Kuwait crisis should be linked to the resolution of other problems in the Middle East.

January 15 came and went without Iraq's withdrawal; on January 17, the coalition began a massive aerial attack against targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Six weeks of this punishing air campaign were followed by a lightning ground assault on February 24 that routed Iraqi forces at a surprisingly low cost to the coalition. On February 27, 100 hours after the attack had begun, United States President George Bush halted the ground offensive. Kuwait had been liberated, and a large swath of southern Iraq was held by the coalition. Baghdad accepted the coalition's cease-fire terms on March 3, which included an immediate release of prisoners of war; 2 days later Iraq's leader annulled the annexation of Kuwait.

One month later, on April 6, Baghdad accepted the terms for a permanent cease-fire in accordance with Security Council Resolution 687, which stipulated continuing an arms embargo for the indefinite future; UN-supervised destruction of all chemical and biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and nuclear infrastructure; Iraqi compensation to Kuwait and other countries for damages incurred during the war; an unequal demilitarized zone along the border with Kuwait extending 6 miles into Iraq and 3 miles inside Kuwait to be patrolled by UN observers; and UN demarcation of the border between the two countries. Iraqi compliance with these demands would result in the gradual lifting of sanctions. Iraq reacted with predictable outrage to Resolution 687, saying it was a vindictive and unwarranted derogation of Iraqi sovereignty. However, it had no option but to accept the terms.

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*The main Security Council resolutions on the Persian Gulf crisis are excerpted in *Current History*, February, 1991, pp. 79, 90.

OPPOSITION AND REBELLION

The end of the war also found Baghdad challenged by an array of Iraqi opposition groups based outside the country and spanning the political spectrum from Islamic fundamentalists, Kurdish autonomists, and nationalists to dissident Baathists, leftists, and liberals. Opposition to the regime was longstanding, but Iraq was a well-policed and "self-policing" society, where the public had internalized the "correct" patterns of behavior. Iraqis had tolerated an authoritarian regime in return for socioeconomic policies that were the most progressive in the Arab world: under Hussein's reign, the Iraqi people had become the best-educated and healthiest Arabs in the Gulf region.

But the Gulf crisis dramatically changed the opposition's fortunes soon after its start. The allied coalition's mobilization against Saddam raised hopes among the opposition that it would no longer be ignored by the international community; dissident groups redoubled their efforts to establish a common anti-Saddam platform and began to court members of the coalition. In December 1990 almost all the members of the Iraqi opposition convened a conference in Damascus and established a steering group, the Joint Action Committee, that condemned Saddam's "dictatorship" and called for his removal and free elections.

Although the opposition had hoped a popular revolt would remove Saddam from power, it was not prepared for the insurrections that erupted at war's end among the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurds in the north. The revolt in the south began after disgruntled infantry streamed back into Basra with harrowing tales of defeat at the hands of a superior foe and mismanagement of the war by their own government. The soldiers, allied with Muslim fundamentalists, launched attacks against government installations and Baath party buildings. Baath party cadre and security officials—most of whom were Shiites—who did not flee or go into hiding were hunted down and murdered.

Within days the revolt had spread to major cities, including the Shiite holy centers of Karbala, An Najaf, Diwaniyah, Hilla, and Mahmudiya. The rebellion profited immensely from the coalition's military presence in southern Iraq, since it inhibited the Iraqi army from using the full range of its remaining firepower;

moreover, the coalition said it would not allow Iraq to use fixed-wing aircraft or chemical weapons against the insurgents.

Iran, despite disclaimers to the contrary, played an important role in the rebellion, infiltrating into southern Iraq ideologically committed and well-trained paramilitary units—the At-Tawibin and Badr divisions made up of fundamentalist exiles and Iraqi prisoners of war from the Iran-Iraq war who had joined the Iranians. Iran also infiltrated members of its own Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards. (At the end of the revolt it was reported that Iraq had captured 6,000 Pasdaran infiltrators.) These units from Iran were generally better armed, better motivated, and better organized than the initiators of the rebellion.

The Iraqi government fought back with its best-trained and most loyal units, the Republican Guards, who made liberal use of their superior firepower and helicopter gunships. Savage street fighting took place in the holy cities, where the rebels fought to the death. The military exacted a terrible revenge against the rebels and those suspected of aiding them, and many civilians caught in the cross fire fled into Iran, coalition-held territory, or the inaccessible marshy region of southern Iraq.

Iraq regained control of Basra on March 12, and Karbala fell to government forces on March 15. The next day Baghdad claimed the rebellion was over, and accused "rancorous traitors" and foreign governments of instigating it. The government's announcement was premature, however, because between March 20 and 29 the capital itself witnessed minor disturbances in the largely Shiite quarters, but these were quickly contained by security forces.¹

Why did the Shiite insurrection fail? First, it was not a general insurrection. The revolt was initially an explosion of pent-up rage characterized by looting and destruction and offering no ideological vision. But when it achieved a semblance of organization and success as a result of leadership provided by the units from Iran, it developed an ideology that proved disastrous: carried away by their euphoria, the rebels raised the green banner of Islam, displayed portraits of deceased Iranian leader the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and called for Islamic rule in Iraq. This dismayed opposition groups outside Iraq, including Shiite fundamentalists, who denied that they intended to bring about Islamic rule.

Most important was the reaction of Sunni Arabs and the Shiite middle class. For this secular-minded segment of the population, the thought of a fundamentalist regime coming to power with Iran's aid was horrifying. Furthermore, the atrocities against government officials were seen as harbingers of the bloodbath to come if the rebels prevailed. And members of the coalition, who had made clear their desire to see Saddam overthrown, were thoroughly disconcerted by a rebellion that might result in the fragmentation of Iraq or install a pro-Iranian fun-

¹For the Iraqi opposition and Shiite revolt, see Antoine Jalkh, "L'opposition irakienne dans tous les états," *Arabies* (Paris), no. 51 (March 1991); Phebe Marr, "Iraq's Future: Plus Ça Change... Or Something Better?" (mimeo., Center for Arab Studies, 1991); Pierre Martin, "Les chiites d'Irak de retour sur la scène politique," *Monde Arabe Maghreb Machrek* (Paris), no. 132 (April-June 1991); Peter Galbraith, "Civil War in Iraq," Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, May 1991 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991); and The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Iraq Country Report* (London), nos. 1, 2, and 3 (1991).

damentalist regime. Their very neutrality during the revolt enabled the Iraqi military to move about freely and crush it.

THE KURDISH REVOLT

The Kurdish revolt erupted in both rural and urban areas when Kurdish civilians, including professionals and intellectuals as well as tens of thousands of Fursan members (Kurdish irregulars), joined the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), which was made up of smaller Kurdish groups, and the rival Kurdish Democratic party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Massoud Barzani, the head of the Kurdish Democratic party, and Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, acted quickly to take control of the rebellion and engaged their veteran guerrilla units in attacks against government forces. Within days and for the first time in their history, the guerrillas took several major urban centers, including the oil center of Kirkuk. By mid-March the IKF had declared that 75 percent of Kurdistan was in rebel hands. The group rapidly moved to restore essential services and civil administration in the "liberated" areas.

After crushing the revolt in the south, Baghdad moved its forces north and launched an offensive to retake all urban centers by April 1. Lacking experience in urban warfare and hoping to spare the urban population, the guerrillas fled into the mountains, but they found that they could not conduct war in rural areas because they had been depopulated and turned into free-fire zones.

The reason for the Kurdish collapse is clear: the guerrillas were not as combat ready as the Iraqi forces. Talabani noted that "we did not realize that the Republican Guards were still in such good shape."

Neither the IKF nor the international community expected what happened as the revolt collapsed: hundreds of thousands of civilians began an exodus from northern Iraq that, at its height, encompassed more than 50 percent of the Kurdish population. Thousands of people died because of cold weather or lack of food as they escaped to the safety of Iran or Turkey. The exodus may have been prompted by fear of reprisals by government forces, including the possibility that chemical weapons might be used, as they had been in 1988. The refugee problem received enormous international media coverage, prompting a massive humanitarian effort to provide the refugees with food, medicine, and shelter. On April 5 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which approved the establishment of "safe havens" in Iraq north of the thirty-sixth parallel that would be

protected by coalition military forces; Kurdish civilians were encouraged to return to these protected zones.

Despite their commitment to overthrow Saddam, the defeated Kurds had no choice but to negotiate. Baghdad balked at many of the Kurds' demands: it adamantly refused to cede Kirkuk, arguing that the city did not have a Kurdish majority; it also had no intention of losing control over a substantial part of the country's oil. The Kurds believed that the government was not negotiating in good faith, and they were not impressed by the political reform program proposed by the government in March.

Negotiations dragged on throughout the summer and autumn. The Kurds were reluctant to sign an agreement, and there were reports of a growing rift between Barzani and Talabani. Barzani distrusted international guarantees and wished to conclude an agreement with Baghdad, while Talabani supported the mainstream opposition's belief that Kurdish autonomy and democracy in Iraq would develop if Saddam were overthrown.

SANCTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVASTATION

The damage Iraq suffered in its war with Iran between 1980 and 1988 pales in comparison with what it has suffered as a result of sanctions, the allied air campaign, and the insurrections.² The trade sanctions that the UN approved on August 6, 1990, seriously affected food stocks; before the war Iraq imported 75 percent of its wheat, 100 percent of its soybean meal, and 90 percent of its maize, sugar, and vegetable oil. Economic sanctions also had a severe impact on local industry, which relied heavily on foreign suppliers for spare parts, raw materials, machinery, and expertise. By the fall of 1991, the private sector suffered from shortages of materials and goods; according to the head of the Iraqi industrial association, 16,000 private ventures were either working at reduced capacity or on the verge of halting operations.

The international community believed that in the short term sanctions would not persuade Iraq to leave Kuwait; the Iraqi government would try to attenuate the effects by careful stockpiling and rationing of available food stocks, reducing the population's already high caloric intake, and by circumventing the sanctions through limited trade with its neighbors. But it was thought that long-term enforcement of the embargo would cause economic dislocation and would paralyze Iraq as the country ran out of food, spare parts, and raw materials after mid-1991. However, the issue of whether sanctions would have forced Iraq out of Kuwait became moot when the coalition decided to use force instead.

The coalition's massive air bombardment of Iraq was aimed not only at the Iraqi military, its supply dumps, and its communications lines, but also at a wide array of economic and industrial targets. The bombing would amplify the economic impact of sanctions, incite the Iraqi people to oppose Saddam, degrade Iraq's ability to

²The analysis of economic devastation is based on Martti Ahtisaari, "Report of the United Nations Mission to Assess Humanitarian Needs," March 27, 1991; and Sadruddin Aga Khan, "Report to the [UN] Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq," July 15, 1991.

sustain itself as an industrial and military power, and create leverage over postwar Iraq, which would not be able to repair extensive damage without outside help.

Iraq suffered particularly extensive damage in three critical areas: the national electric power grid, telecommunications, and the oil industry. Coalition air forces damaged 17 of Iraq's 20 electric power plants; 11 were totally destroyed. At the height of the summer of 1991, when electricity demand was at its peak, Iraqi power-generating capacity was 40 percent of the prewar level of 9,500 megawatts. The damage to the electric power grid forced closures or the slowing down of operations in the public-health sector, refrigeration plants, and sewage treatment units; the last resulted in raw sewage flowing through streets and into rivers. The incidence of diarrheal diseases increased dramatically.

Telephone exchanges and radio and television stations as well as the country's extensive road and bridge network were targeted and suffered extensive damage: half of Iraq's telephone lines were destroyed as were scores of bridges, including many of those spanning the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The damage to much of what had been a modern infrastructure hindered the ability of government and relief agencies to deliver food-stuffs to rural regions, where shortages were more acute.

The oil industry has been absolutely critical to Iraq's economic development over the years, providing the country with as much as 95 percent of its foreign-exchange earnings. Coalition forces dropped 1,200 tons of high explosives on 28 major oil installations. The immediate goal was to curtail Iraq's refining capacity and thus its ability to deliver fuel to the armed forces. Facilities in the south suffered the greatest damage because of their proximity to important military targets (Republican Guard concentrations and supply dumps), while the facilities around Kirkuk suffered less during the war and incurred minor damage during the Kurdish insurgency.

The Iraqis have repaired some of the facilities. By the autumn of 1991 Iraq was able to produce 450,000 barrels of oil a day for domestic consumption and 50,000 barrels a day for export to Jordan. Total production capacity, however, was estimated at 1.5 million barrels a day; 1 million of this could be exported by pipelines through Turkey if sanctions are lifted. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil has said that by the end of 1992 Iran could achieve its prewar production level of 3.2 million barrels a day if it receives desperately needed chemical additives, spare parts, and help to repair damage to the oil industry.

A UN mission that visited Iraq in mid-March issued a report saying the war had "wrought near-apocalyptic results" on a highly urbanized and mechanized society. The report drew the world's attention to the combined effects of sanctions and war damage on the population, noting rapidly dwindling stocks of food and medicine and declining health and sanitary conditions. Iraq

repeatedly requested that it be allowed to sell oil to satisfy basic needs, but in its first formal review of sanctions in June the Security Council concluded that lifting the sanctions was not justified since Iraq had not fully complied with the provisions of Resolution 687.

Another UN report on Iraq's economic and social crisis in mid-July urgently requested that Iraq be permitted to import \$7-billion worth of food, medicine, and spare parts. The Security Council "relented" and on August 15 passed Resolution 706, allowing Iraq to sell \$1.6-billion worth of oil over a six-month period. Proceeds from the sale will go into an escrow account to be divided into three unequal amounts: almost \$1 billion will be used to buy food and medicine, while the rest is to be divided between reparations and paying UN peace-keeping expenses.

The task of reconstruction is enormous; Iraqi officials claim that the Kuwait affair cost them \$200 billion. This is in addition to \$200 billion spent on the Iran-Iraq war. Long-term reconstruction will depend on foreign-exchange revenues, trade, foreign technical expertise, and the willingness of the Iraqi private sector to take a more vigorous role in the economy. Iraqis know that they cannot engage in long-term reconstruction if the sanctions remain in place. Even if the sanctions are lifted the country will face formidable obstacles; indebtedness makes the country a terrible credit risk, and reparations payments will siphon off as much as 30 percent of Iraq's income for the indefinite future.

A FORMIDABLE MILITARY

Initial figures of Iraqi losses during the war led to the hasty conclusion that Iraq's remaining army consisted largely of poorly equipped, low-grade infantry divisions. By summer's end this was found to be inaccurate; the war had destroyed between 45 and 50 percent of a huge inventory, but Iraq retained 2,400 tanks; 4,400 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles; between 1,000 and 2,000 artillery pieces, mortars, and howitzers; and 250 multiple rocket launchers.

The air force suffered the most devastating losses: of a prewar total of 700 warplanes, Iraq had no more than 300 left. Iran had allowed 115 Iraqi warplanes, including many of Iraq's top-of-the-line Soviet- and French-built fighters and about 30 Iraqi Airways civilian jets, to flee the country and land in Iran during the course of the war. Most of Iraq's helicopter fleet survived intact, as was evident during the insurrections.

The army has been restructured; instead of a ramshackle 1-million-man force, the Iraqis now have between 350,000 and 400,000 troops, of which the Republican Guards constitute a substantial and growing element. Most of the other units are special forces and regular army armored and mechanized divisions shorn of the low-grade infantry divisions that performed dimly in both the Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf war. Throughout last spring and summer the army

received substantial pay and benefit increases in order to restore its morale. The army is now a leaner, more professional force that would be more formidable if Iraq were allowed to rearm.

Iraq's comprehensive military industries program was severely damaged by the war. By 1987 Iraq was self-sufficient in ammunition and many basic weapons, and it had established a burgeoning semicovert nonconventional weapons program. Many of the installations that produced weapons were destroyed by the coalition bombing, but in midsummer 1991, UN inspection teams and other sources reported that Iraq had accumulated extensive stockpiles of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. It also had an extensive and sophisticated uranium enrichment program that would have eventually given Iraq a steady supply of enriched uranium—the key ingredient in a fission bomb. The UN teams were impressed by the breadth, scope, and progress of Iraq's "Manhattan Project" and by the skill of Iraqi engineers and scientists.

SADDAM'S GRIP ON POWER

The portrait of Saddam as an omnipotent ruler was shattered by his defeat in the war and by the intensity of the insurrections. Profound bitterness was expressed by many who felt that Saddam had badly miscalculated or blundered into a trap laid for him by the coalition. Yet he is the symbol of Iraq's achievements; he brought Iraq into an era of military strength and scientific progress. The message is clear: only under Saddam can Iraq regain its former strength. But he cannot rule alone, and has moved to strengthen his control over the state apparatus.

The powerful position of Hussein's followers from his hometown of Tikrit has been enhanced. The innermost circle of power is made up of Tikritis who are Saddam's close relatives. These half-brothers, sons, cousins, and sons-in-law occupy the top positions in the Special Bureau and the security/intelligence services; the latter is under the control of Sabawi Ibrahim, one of Saddam's half-brothers. Ali Hassan al-Majid, a paternal cousin of Saddam's who is noted for his "flair" in pacifying unruly regions, was appointed interior minister in March 1991. Tikritis and other Sunni Arabs have reinforced their positions in the officer corps, which has been purged of politically suspect officers and those who failed in their duties during the war. Hussein Kamel Hassan, Saddam's cousin and son-in-law, is minister of defense,** while the new chief of staff, General Iyad Fathi al-Rawi—a former head of the Republican Guards—is a Sunni Arab.

Loyalty to Saddam is cemented by family ties and by other factors, such as collective fear of and reliance on Saddam, who has adroitly handled his family over the

years and who has not hesitated to punish and reward. They also fear that if Saddam is overthrown their lives could be jeopardized. A third source of loyalty is economic; Tikritis have prospered despite the regime's strong anticorruption ethic. When the government introduced its privatization measures in 1987, Tikritis bought state enterprises at low prices and then sold them at considerable profit to middle-class businessmen.

CONTROL OF THE CENTER

Saddam also manages to remain in power through his control of and support in the "center." This refers not only to the geographic center of support in the Sunni Arab heartland and Baghdad, but also to a socioeconomic and cultural center made up of those with the nation's highest standards of living.

The center held during the rebellions for several reasons. First, there was hostility toward the goals of the rebellions in the north and the south: the Kurds are seen as putative separatists who should not be allowed to control the oil-rich northern province of At-Tamim. And the Shiite rebellion held the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime.

Second, the center held because of loyalty among the part of the population that has confidence in the Baath party's commitment to secularism, economic development, and the promotion of a distinct and nonsectarian Iraqi nationalism, or because of what can be called the "legitimacy of the worst alternative"—the belief that if Saddam is overthrown the situation will not improve but, rather, deteriorate dramatically. Third, fear of the pervasive presence of the security and military apparatus may have inspired caution.

The center has its grievances and problems, including declining standards of living: annual inflation is 2,000 percent, and wages and salaries have not risen in real terms for the last three years. Job security in the stagnant economy is nonexistent, and unemployment has reached 20 percent; poverty has increased, and the middle class has seen its savings wiped out. Many have been forced to pawn their valuables or take second jobs. The poor increasingly rely on the state for basic needs, but the rationed products distributed by the government provide only 55 percent of the calories needed daily, according to Minister of Commerce Mohammed Mahdi Salih.

Saddam realized that restoring law and order was not enough. To maintain the people's loyalty the regime had to implement political reforms and reconstruct the country quickly; this was the theme of Saddam's speech on March 16, his first after the war ended. That same month Saddam appointed Saadun Hamadi, a Shiite and veteran Baathist, as prime minister; he headed a Cabinet of technocrats charged with reconstruction, political and economic reforms, and bringing an end to Iraq's international isolation.

In his speech, Saddam declared that the leadership's

**Hassan was replaced as defense minister by Majid on November 6.

commitment to building a "democratic society based on a constitution, law, institutions, and [party] pluralism. . . is an irrevocable and final decision." Hamadi expressed the belief that Iraq would move slowly from the revolutionary phase of politics, under which Iraq has existed since 1968, to constitutional politics characterized by the supremacy of law. Sweeping political reforms were to include the implementation of a constitution that had been drafted in 1990, a free press, eventual abolition of the supralegal Revolutionary Court (charged with trying crimes against the state) and the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, and the establishment of a multiparty system.

The regime may find it difficult to shed its authoritarianism and may fear that if it goes too far too quickly it may lose control like the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe did in 1989. The new multiparty law approved by the Revolutionary Command Council on September 3 is indicative of both the regime's definition of competitive party politics and its fears. The law dropped an earlier provision banning any party whose ideology was inimical to Baathism; it insisted, however, that all parties "should value and be proud of of Iraq's heritage, glorious history and achievements attained by national struggle; particularly by the great revolutions of. . . 1958 and. . . 1968" that overthrew the monarchy and brought the Baath party to power.

Under the new multiparty law, parties may not be founded on the basis of apostasy, racism, regionalism, or anti-Arabism; an initial ban on religious parties was lifted but Communist, sectarian, and separatist groups are proscribed. Only the Baath party may engage in political activity in the armed forces and security services, a condition betraying both the fear that hostile forces might proselytize in these institutions as a means of overthrowing the Baath party and the regime's determination to ensure that the ruling party's domination of political life remains unchallenged. In September Saddam made clear that Western-style democracy is not welcome in Iraq and that Iraqis who support the importation of it to Iraq would not be allowed to hold any leading positions.

The surprise removal of Hamadi from office on September 14 at the Iraqi Baath party's tenth congress raised questions about the future of political reforms. Hamadi was perceived as committed to implementation of the reforms, and he may have expressed his views too forcefully for some at the congress. The Beirut newspaper *Al-Hayat* claims that Hamadi fell victim to the party's old guard, which feared for the party's position. But the situation may have been more complicated than that. Hamadi may have run afoul of the leadership for not having achieved solid progress in the task of reconstruction; Saddam had vowed in March that ministers would be given four to six months to prove themselves. The new prime minister, Muhammad Hamza al-

Zubaydi, is a political lightweight who is not expected to be too independent-minded.

THE PARIAH STATE

Iraq's relations with the outside world remain stymied despite persistent Iraqi efforts to break the isolation. Iraqis point out that they are not surprised by the stance taken by the United States and Britain during the crisis and after the war, but France's active participation in the coalition was an unpleasant surprise given the special relationship the two countries had developed over two decades.

From an Iraqi perspective the West went to war not because of fundamental concern over Kuwait but because it could not countenance the emergence of a militarily strong and politically influential Iraq; under Saddam, Iraq was breaking the shackles of military, political, and technological dependence. This threatened the West's domination of the region as well as posing a danger to its creation, "the Zionist entity," that is, Israel. But not long after the end of the war Iraq expressed an interest in restoring political and economic relations with the Western powers that were its main trading partners before the crisis.

The West has not been forthcoming, and Iraq's relations with this powerful group of countries are dictated by the latter's continued insistence that Saddam must be removed from power. A coup by the army or the party did not materialize at the war's end, and despite calls for the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam, Washington was not interested in helping the rebels during the insurrections, fearing, as has been noted, that Iraq might become fragmented or fall under Iranian domination. "We don't want to involve ourselves in the internal conflict in Iraq," was White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater's comment in late March.

In order to remove Saddam, the United States and its closest allies have maintained unremitting pressure in the form of sanctions and the humiliating derogation of Iraqi national sovereignty mandated by Security Council Resolution 687. The aim is to persuade Iraqis that neither their lives nor the status of their country will be normalized until Saddam leaves office.

Iraq succumbed to hubris in 1990: Saddam Hussein hoped to make his country rich beyond belief and infinitely more powerful by incorporating Kuwait. Then he promised that the war for Kuwait would be "the mother of all battles," but it turned out to be "the mother of all defeats." The Iraqi leader himself has reportedly compared the damage from the war with that wrought on the country by the Mongol hordes of Hülegü in 1258. The comparison is not inapt: one of the most highly developed countries in the Middle East has been crippled and left with limited sovereignty and a limited regional and international role. ■

Israel's restraint during the Persian Gulf war in the face of Iraqi attempts to terrorize and provoke the Shamir government won wide praise from the United States. But American gratitude for this restraint has not translated into tangible rewards or into American willingness to support Israel's positions as it faces its Arab neighbors at the long-awaited peace conference.

Israel since the Persian Gulf War

BY DON PERETZ

The "new era" that many Israelis hoped would follow the Persian Gulf war's end last February increasingly appears to be a mirage, fading into the distance as Israel continues to be overwhelmed by a myriad of problems. These include a faltering economy, a tidal wave of immigrants that will take years to absorb, housing shortages for both new arrivals and long-time residents, the danger of a catastrophic water crisis, continued unrest in the occupied territories and among Israeli Arab citizens, and deteriorating relations with Israel's only important ally—the United States.

THE ECONOMY FALTERS

Ever since Israel was established in 1948, defense costs have overshadowed the economy, devouring the lion's share of the national budget. These costs have escalated since the 1970s, and if it were not for the \$1.8 billion in annual military assistance from the United States, Israel would be unable to maintain what some analysts have called the fourth or fifth most powerful army in the world. Before the Six Day War in 1967, defense expenditures were about 8 to 10 percent of gross national product (GNP). Since then they have steadily climbed to about 20 percent, where the rate has stabilized. (In most Western European countries, defense expenditures are between 1 and 6 percent of GNP.)

Since Israel and Egypt signed the Camp David accords in 1979, the United States has also provided more than \$1 billion a year in economic assistance.*

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*United States economic aid to Israel was \$1.2 billion for 1991.

¹The New York Times, September 22, 1991.

United States aid in the past quarter-century totals at least \$35 billion (when adjusted for inflation the total is \$77 billion, or \$16,000 for each Israeli citizen). Nearly three-fourths of this amount consists of outright grants rather than long-term loans. In addition to direct assistance, Israel has received other American aid in the form of surplus military equipment, financial guarantees for new housing, and refugee assistance.¹

In 1991 United States government aid to Israel included, in addition to the usual \$3.2 billion, \$650 million in compensation for the destruction and "pain and suffering" Israel endured from Iraqi missile attacks during the Gulf war, a special military grant of \$700 million, \$400 million in housing guarantees approved by the United States Congress, and several smaller items. These sums were assured before the squabble between the administration of United States President George Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir erupted last fall over Israel's demand for another \$10 billion in housing loan guarantees to cover construction costs of homes for new immigrants during the next five years.

The Shamir government believed that it was entitled to the \$10 billion in guarantees because of Israel's willingness to accept the hundreds of thousands of Jews who have hastily departed the Soviet Union for fear of increasing anti-Semitism. Furthermore, Shamir has argued, because of Israel's "restraint" during the war—that is, refraining from response to the Iraqi Scud missile attacks—it deserves special consideration.

There is no doubt that the economy is in perilous condition. Annual inflation hovers around 23 percent. Unemployment has increased to more than 10 percent and, according to Israel's Finance Ministry, will probably peak at 14 percent by 1994. Per capita consumption during the next three years will grow by an average of only about 1 percent annually. Despite aid from the United States and contributions from world Jewry, Israel still has relatively large pockets of poverty. According to the most recent official data, collected in 1986 and 1987, 8.3 percent of Israeli Jews and 46.1 percent of Israel's Arab population lived below the poverty line.

The influx over the past 18 months of some 300,000 new immigrants, more than 90 percent from the Soviet Union, has substantially increased the number of unemployed and impoverished Israeli Jews. A high percentage of the Soviet immigrants are professionals who cannot find work in the country, which already has a surplus of professionals such as physicians, engineers, musicians, and university professors. The Finance Ministry has forecast that by 1994 some 20,000 physicians will be unemployed.

Israel's economic woes are exacerbated by structural problems. For years the government has ignored warnings about weaknesses in its strongly socialist economy. As a result business and industry are unable to make the adjustments required to create jobs and housing for the 250,000 Soviet immigrants, let alone the additional 1 million expected during the next few years.

The most important change required is privatization of the more than 50 percent of the economy now in the public sector. In 1984 Israel ranked second in the proportion of its labor force employed in public services when compared with Western European countries. Despite several hiring freezes declared by Israel's Likud governments since 1977, the public sector has continued to expand. The state has a virtual monopoly in manpower supply through its control of labor markets, where most employers must hire their workers. Another obstacle to private investment is high taxes. Indirect taxation is much greater than in other developed countries, and there are still strict controls on imports and exports and relatively high customs duties and sales taxes.

The government plays a direct role in business and industry. It holds more than half ownership in over 150 corporations, which are managed through 16 ministries; these corporations produce about one-fifth of the national income. Nevertheless, they seem to be more an economic burden than a source of profit, and are often headed by political appointees or individuals who owe their posts to party connections. Directorships of these enterprises are one of the rewards given to retiring Israeli generals, and some have been criticized by the state comptroller for mismanagement or incompetence.

The Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), which has close ties with Israel's Labor party, has by far the greatest economic clout of any special group. More than three-quarters of all Israelis are affiliated with one of the Histadrut's groups, whether as members of its health service (Kupat Holim), one of its 40 trade unions, employed in one of its vast economic enterprises, or associated with an affiliated cooperative, sport club, or cultural organization. By the late 1980s Histadrut economic affiliates were responsible for more than 70 percent of the country's agricultural produce, 17 percent of its industrial output, and some 12 percent of construction. They accounted for one-fifth of total domestic output and employed one-quarter of the work force.

Early in 1991, powerful Histadrut-affiliated unions

blocked government proposals to lift stiff tariffs on products that might compete with Israeli-manufactured items. The United States government and American and Israeli economists have repeatedly urged Israel to make its domestic markets more competitive by reducing tariffs, which often double the cost of imported products. They argue that only with increased competition will Israel produce goods that are competitive in world markets.

Lack of competition is one reason why Israel has a relatively low GNP per capita. One of Israel's largest banks, the Discount Bank, recently revealed that GNP per capita is \$7,000, compared to \$17,729 in the United States and \$26,773 in Switzerland. Another reason for low GNP per capita is that only 33 percent of the population is employed (the Western European average is 50 percent).

THE HOUSING CRISIS

The current housing crisis reflects many of the economic dilemmas facing the country. Since the arrival of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants in the past 18 months, government officials have quarreled over who was to blame for the failure to prepare for their accommodation, employment, and integration into Israeli society. They have also quarreled over who should now assume responsibility for such tasks and where to turn for assistance.

Housing shortages have resulted in escalating building costs and skyrocketing rents. The shortage has affected not only new immigrants, but also many long-time residents and newly married couples who cannot find or afford apartments. During the past year many native Israelis were forced from their apartments because of rising rent; many set up tent encampments as a form of protest or because they had nowhere else to live. New Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants are frequently quartered in crowded hotels that have been taken over by the government.

Figures vary from week to week on how many new homes have become available or will be built, but costs are certainly shooting upward. Between May and July 1991 housing prices increased about 16.5 percent. But bank officials promised that these prices would soon be forced down again because of a slowdown in immigration.

The Gulf war set back government plans to construct 100,000 new housing units by the end of 1991. Iraqi missiles destroyed hundreds of homes in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and their environs. Even more damaging was the idling of four-fifths of housing construction, which had been dependent on Arab labor from the West Bank and Gaza.

During the six weeks of the war, the government banned all Arab travel from the occupied areas into Israel. This was a blow to the construction, agriculture, and service industries in Israel, which relied heavily on the more than 100,000 day laborers from the Gaza Strip

and the West Bank. Millions of dollars were lost when Palestinian workers were prevented from reporting to their jobs in the fruit and flower export business, a principal foreign exchange earner.

A widely quoted estimate of the war's cost to Israel was \$3 billion. However, Dov Lautman, the chairman of Israel's Coordinating Bureau of Economic Organizations, asserted that this figure was exaggerated and that the war did not "hurt the economy very much" since it affected only a few sectors.²

When hostilities ceased in February, some Palestinians were permitted to return to their jobs in Israel, but the number of permits for crossing the Green Line that separates the occupied territories from Israel proper was greatly reduced. Obtaining a permit also became much more difficult. Even though many Jews, including new immigrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, were beginning to do "Arab work," unemployment climbed steadily. In the Knesset, questions were raised about the incongruity of paying large amounts of unemployment insurance when agriculture and the construction industry were begging for workers. Some employers even requested government permission to import low-paid labor from Turkey, Portugal, and Yugoslavia.

THE WATER CRISIS

Another threat to Israel's economy is the rapid depletion of the country's water resources. Recently aquifers fell below the "red line"—the point below which disaster looms. Israeli officials declared that they might have to cut agricultural production by nearly one-third, and the possibility was raised that drinking water might have to be rationed. The state comptroller has stated that the country was on the verge of a "catastrophic shortage" because of 25 years of neglect. The shortage was critical even before the arrival of the new immigrants and before the announcement of plans for an additional 1 million.

The water deficit exists even though Israel controls sources in the West Bank that now provide about one-quarter of the country's total supply. Israel has become so dependent on West Bank water that Minister of Agriculture Rafael Eitan placed an advertisement in the press stating that under no conditions could Israel give up the West Bank because it would undermine the nation's agricultural economy. The advertisement warned that the "intense interdependence and the scarcity of water supplies accentuate even more the problem of authority" in "Judea and Samaria" (the West Bank). To relinquish control would "leave Israel without any legal, moral, or

practical means to prevent the repatriation of a million Palestinians." The minister concluded, "It is difficult to conceive of any political solution consistent with Israel's survival that does not involve complete, continued Israeli control of the water and sewage systems, and of the associated infrastructure, including power supply and road network, essential to their operation, maintenance, and accessibility."³ Even if arguments that Israel's security requires control of the territories were overcome, the hydrological arguments would remain.

Hydropolitics are critical in Israel's relations with its neighbors, especially with Jordan. King Hussein recently observed that although he could conceive of few reasons for war with Israel, he might be compelled to fight for water even though he thought he would be defeated. The problem is that the Jordan River and its sources have limited reserves. Both Israel and Jordan have been overdrawing the total annual usable water stock by about 15 percent a year. If this pattern continues, much of the water stock will be depleted in less than 10 years.

In the past, disputes over water sources have led to confrontation with Syria, which controls a substantial share of the Jordan River's sources. Hydrological as well as security arguments may block Israel's return of the Golan Heights to Syria. Streams that flow southward from Lebanon are also vital; some Israelis have argued that Israel should maintain its security zone in southern Lebanon to ensure control of these headwaters.⁴

THE GULF WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The war and Iraq's missile attacks galvanized Jewish public opinion in support of the government. Unlike the 1982 war in Lebanon or the army's campaign against the intifada (the uprising in the occupied territories), which were widely criticized in Israel, government policies now received nearly unanimous support. Even many of Israel's most prominent doves rushed to back the United States-led coalition's war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Yael Dayan, a leader of Peace Now, proclaimed at a pro-war rally in January 1991, "Peace Now means war now!" Many prominent members of the peace movement signed statements criticizing "European pacifists" for opposing the war against Iraq.

Two of the country's best-known and most outspoken doves were enthusiastic supporters of the war. Dedi Zucker, a Ratz (Citizen's Rights party) member of the Knesset, said that he wanted to "embrace Yitzhak Shamir," the leader of the right-wing Likud, because he did not retaliate for Iraqi missile attacks and thereby unravel the allied coalition against Iraq. But he quickly withdrew his affection when Shamir invited former General Rehavam (Ghandi) Ze'evi, leader of the Moledet (Motherland) party, to join the Cabinet in February; Moledet's platform calls for the "transfer" (that is, expulsion) of Arabs from the occupied territories.

Ratz Knesset member Yossi Sarid was chagrined that Israel's Arabs seemed aloof and that most Palestinians in

²*Jerusalem Post* (international edition), March 9, 1991, p. 20.

³*Ibid.*, August 18, 1990, p. 7.

⁴See Frederic C. Hof, *Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon Frontier, 1916–1984* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 24, 27.

the occupied territories were enthusiastic about Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Sarid, who had been an advocate of dialogue with the Palestinians, asserted that from now on they could "call me; I won't call them!"

The differing perceptions of Israeli Jews and Arabs about the Gulf crisis polarized the two communities and threatened to undermine the progress toward rapprochement that had been made in recent years by groups such as Peace Now. When the missiles began to fall on Israel, however, most Israeli Arab citizens changed their outlook. While Palestinians living under occupation generally believed that "the Israelis got what they had coming to them," the leaders of Arab local councils and Arab public figures in Israel invited Jewish families whose homes had been destroyed to stay in their villages. Several Arab Knesset members who had either supported Saddam or had been ambivalent now condemned the attacks on Israel. The head of the Israeli Arab Supreme Follow-up Committee, the country's principal Arab representative body, called on "every Arab in Israel to help those injured by the missiles." Jews and Arabs were now "brothers and it is the duty of brothers to help each other," he proclaimed.

THE PALESTINIANS AFTER THE WAR

Since the war ended, the strains in relations between Israeli Jewish and Arab citizens have diminished somewhat, but the minority is still resentful of the suspicion and hostility that resulted from the patriotic fervor that swept through the Jewish community. Lutfi Mashour, editor of the Nazareth Arabic weekly *A-Sinara*, wrote, "During the Gulf crisis, we were treated more unequally than ever. There were generalized accusations. . . incited against us, despite the responsibility we demonstrated. . . . Maybe now we'll demonstrate even greater responsibility in our demands for equality."⁵

Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank are still living with the consequences of the war. Few Israelis have understood the reasons for their enthusiastic approval of Iraq during the Gulf crisis, nor have the Palestinians been forgiven. Although a few workers from the territories have been permitted to return to jobs in Israel, most are still unemployed. Farmers and shopkeepers have not yet recovered from the curfew imposed by the Israeli army early in 1991 that led to massive loss of income.

Palestinians in the occupied territories were shocked by Iraq's defeat. In the Gaza Strip, the director of the area's one mental health clinic reported that there were twice as many patients as before the war, an increase he attributed to the economic crisis and to despair and disillusionment over the war's outcome. There has been some criticism of Yasir Arafat and the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but the over-

whelming majority of the Palestinian population still supports the organization. Many have argued that if their own leaders were taken in by Saddam, then it was that much easier for the average Palestinian to have been fooled by the Iraqi president.

Among Palestinians in the territories, reaction to Saddam's defeat has taken different forms. Many have turned to Islamic fundamentalism, which has led to polarization between the fundamentalists and PLO secularists. Violence has increased, not only against Israeli occupation forces, but also against fellow Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the occupation authorities. There is also increased lawlessness in patriotic disguise, for example, murder and robbery undertaken by youths in the name of the resistance.

GOVERNMENT AS USUAL

The unity in the Jewish community that coalesced behind the Shamir government during the crisis began to wear thin soon after the war ended. Even within the governing "national coalition" there were bitter disagreements, especially after the United States launched its postwar initiative for a Middle East peace conference. Prime Minister Shamir's 1989 peace plan, the basis for Israeli participation in the renewed negotiations, was attacked by Likud's right-wing coalition partners. The plan, which provided for local elections and limited autonomy for West Bank and Gaza Arabs, was denounced by the Tehiya party, which had broken away from Likud because of its opposition to territorial concessions. Tehiya's leader, Science and Energy Minister Yuval Ne'eman, asserted that neither his party nor the like-minded Tsomet party would ever agree to Palestinian autonomy or elections, and neither would Mokedat. The Gulf war, he said, proved that elections among the Palestinians would endanger Israel's existence: "They already voted when they danced on the roofs as they watched Iraqi Scud missiles falling on Tel Aviv."

Mokedat's leader, Rehavam Ze'evi, added that the war had brought a resurgence of violence to the country and called for suspension of peace initiatives. Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, Shamir's fellow Likud member and a leading candidate to succeed him as prime minister, shared the three parties' skepticism.

In 1989 Sharon had nearly split Likud into factions because of his opposition to Shamir's proposals. Sharon's own remedy for resolving the Palestinian conflict was to make Jordan the Palestinian state: "Jordan is Palestine," he said. Now he accused the government of being brainwashed by the PLO and succumbing to the Palestinian "propaganda lie." Israel's wars proved that "any concession whatever in the 'territories' is a certain recipe for national suicide." Establishment of an Arab state in the "Land of Israel" (Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip), he cautioned, "has but one meaning: a death sentence, with slow agony or in one single blow, against the State of Israel."⁶

⁵*New Outlook*, vol. 34, no. 3 (April-May 1991), p. 33.

⁶*Jerusalem Post* (international edition), April 13, 1991, p. 8.

Opposition to the nationalist policies of the Likud-led government by the Labor Alignment and the six parties to its left is also splintered. Even within the Labor party there is a range of attitudes toward the United States peace initiatives, the future of the occupied territories, and Arab-Israeli relations that covers the political spectrum. Some Labor party leaders would return nearly all the territories, except for East Jerusalem, as part of a conclusive peace settlement. Although "land for peace" is a Labor party slogan, there are also those in the party who do not differ greatly with Shamir on issues of war and peace (although few, if any, would agree with Sharon).

But it is not likely that Labor and the dovish left will moderate the Shamir government's policies in the peace negotiations or in relations with the United States. When Labor party leader and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres launched a bitter attack on Shamir in October for placing Israel on a "collision course" with the United States by "insulting" United States President George Bush in the controversy over loan guarantees, only a minority of the Israeli public agreed with him. This crisis, Peres feared, was the most serious ever in United States-Israeli relations. By jeopardizing good relations with the United States, the Likud government was about to lose Israel's most important defense and diplomatic asset.

Among the imponderables likely to affect future Israeli government policy are the political views of the new Soviet arrivals. Soviet immigrants are expected to make up between 15 and 20 percent of the voters in the next election, which is to be held no later than October 1992. All political parties are bidding for their votes, but many Soviet Jews are inclined to form their own new bloc. A sample poll of those who arrived between September 1989 and March 1990 showed that a majority favored a new Soviet immigrant party. If one was not established, 46 percent would vote for right-wing parties; only 21 percent would back Labor.⁷

Israel's multiparty electoral system is yet another obstacle to substantial internal economic reform and to major concessions in peace negotiations. Because no party has ever attained a Knesset majority, all governments have been coalitions of diverse and often conflicting ideologies. Prime Minister Shamir is dependent on the votes of the three militantly nationalist parties to the right of Likud. Without their support, his coalition would collapse; thus Shamir emerges as the "moderate" in today's "national" government.

Electoral reform is on the agenda of the present Knesset, but it has been on many previous agendas. Observers are not optimistic about change in the near future because of the inherent problems of a multiparty system, so it is unlikely that there will be significant change in the economic system, the political structure, or the government's refusal to give up territory for peace, recognize and negotiate with the PLO, or suspend Jewish settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. ■

⁷Ibid., June 8, 1991, p. 14.

"The emerging system of Palestinian politics is not likely to be based on the old formula of total PLO dominance or to be exclusively derived from the expanding role of Palestinian activists in the occupied territories. Instead, it will rest on interaction between Palestinians in the occupied territories and those living in exile."

The Shift in Palestinian Thinking

BY MUHAMMAD MUSLIH

Another 1948 is in the making for the Palestinians. With the end of the Persian Gulf war, only 70,000 of the 400,000 Palestinians who lived in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion in August 1990 remain, facing an uncertain future. The 250,000 who fled to Jordan during the Gulf crisis now live in a state of homelessness, joblessness, and despair. Palestinian financial losses since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis are estimated at \$10 billion; this figure excludes the loss of Palestinian assets in Kuwait and the costs the war imposed on the Palestinian economy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have basically reversed the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, which recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestine question, once at the top of the Arab agenda—at least rhetorically—has been deferred, though not abandoned. Why?

The answer lies in the way PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and senior PLO officials guided the ship of Palestinian politics during the Gulf crisis. Throughout the crisis several Arafats were in evidence. There was the democratic Arafat, who had to take the wishes of his constituency into consideration; the single-minded Arafat, who dismissed the better judgment of some of his most senior colleagues; and the overconfident Arafat, who mistakenly believed that with his limited resources he could act as a mediator between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Saddam's Arab enemies. Above all, there was the Arafat who was perceived as the "legitimizing" of Saddam's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Which aspect of Arafat's behavior best conformed to

reality? Certainly, there was overwhelming support for Saddam among the Palestinians living in Jordan and the occupied territories, not because he invaded Kuwait, but because he stood up to the United States, Israel's protector and supporter. As far as the Palestinians were concerned, the fact that United States President George Bush mobilized the world to reverse Iraq's seizure of Kuwait but had done nothing to force Israel to comply with United Nations (UN) resolutions concerning the occupied territories was the epitome of selective morality. Moreover, Saddam misled the Palestinians into believing that Iraq had a deterrent against nuclear Israel, thus preparing the ground to end Israel's occupation. As Palestinian journalist Hanna Siniora explained the Palestinians' positive reaction to Saddam, "When a drowning man sees land disappear slowly in front of him, and suddenly a man throws him a rope, he will not ask who that man is."

The Palestinians were drowning before the Gulf crisis. The end of the cold war signaled the further strengthening of Israeli hegemony. The prospect of a "Greater" Israel—that is, one that included the territory now under Israeli control in the West Bank—was becoming more of a reality, thanks primarily to the influx of over 200,000 Soviet Jews. Moreover, "transfer" policy, which many Israeli right-wingers interpret as the expulsion of the Palestinians from the territories, was a topic of public discussion; peace-for-peace rather than the land-for-peace formula became the official policy of the Israeli government; settlement activity in the occupied territories was escalating in leaps and bounds; and dialogue between the United States and the PLO was frozen. All this took place against a backdrop of Arab acquiescence and inaction.

This explains, but does not necessarily justify, the pro-Saddam reaction of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Jordan. Arafat, who was by then more mindful of the preferences of his West Bank and Gaza constituency than he had been five or ten years earlier, rode the popular tide in the territories and took a pro-Iraq stance.

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DISAGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT

Another aspect of Arafat's behavior was that he uncharacteristically dismissed not only the advice of some of his closest aides, but also the desires of the Palestinians in Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf. These included Salah Khalaf, the number two man in the PLO (who was assassinated at the start of the Gulf war), and many Palestinian intellectuals who wanted the PLO to distance itself from Saddam. When it did not, they strongly opposed Arafat's handling of the crisis. Many Palestinians living in Kuwait and the Gulf, especially those with business interests or government positions, were also critical of Arafat. Activists from the mainstream Fatah faction of the PLO in Kuwait did not simply condemn the Iraqi invasion; some of them even joined the Kuwaiti underground.

Those who disagreed with Arafat argued that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a violation of the principles from which the Palestinian cause drew its legitimacy and moral strength. They also noted that the Palestinians, vulnerable as they were, should avoid taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts and that Kuwait had always supported the Palestinians and had opened its borders to skilled and unskilled Palestinian labor. Finally, even the appearance of a mild tilt toward Iraq would dry up Gulf financial support for the Palestinians, thus eroding the Palestinian economic base.

Why did Arafat choose to ignore these points? Some say the reason was Saddam's seduction of Arafat at least two years before the crisis with facilities, logistics, and the unrealistic promise of deterring Israel. Others mention the emergence of a more militant and uncompromising Israel.

But there is an additional reason. The PLO, which emerged and operates in exile, has traditionally articulated the political desires of the Palestinians in the diaspora. With the onset of the *intifada* (uprising) in the occupied territories in December 1987, the balance of power started to shift to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. While the Palestinians have always viewed themselves as an indivisible political community, the *intifada* forced the PLO leadership in Tunis to pay closer attention to the views of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. The overriding concern of these Palestinians is to end the occupation, even if it entails recognition of Israel.

With his view fixed on the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Jordan, Arafat thus distanced himself from the largely anti-Saddam position of the Palestinians living in the Gulf states. He instead adopted

an ambivalent attitude: support for Iraq as the challenger of foreign forces, as well as opposition to Iraq as the invader of Kuwait. In so doing, he assumed that his behavior would ensure continued Palestinian support in Jordan and the occupied territories without alienating the Arab Gulf countries. The rapid unfolding of events proved the second half of his assumption deadly wrong. Arafat ended up a leader with a diminished constituency, since his sizable base in Kuwait literally vanished. At the same time, he lost his Arab allies in the Gulf.

Another example of Arafat's miscalculations was his attempt to mediate between Iraq and the Arab governments aligned against it. His behavior in this regard may have stemmed both from a desire to localize the Gulf crisis and solve it within the Arab "family," and his wish to gain political capital from his efforts if he was successful. Arafat, however, failed to see that mediation required that all the parties involved share a spirit of genuine cooperation.

Saddam, at least as of August 3, 1990, when a majority of the Arab League members adopted a resolution condemning Iraq's invasion the day before and calling for an unconditional withdrawal, adamantly refused to pull his troops out of Kuwait. According to an August 1991 Jordanian White Paper, Saddam agreed to withdraw if the Arab League did not condemn Iraq or invite foreign powers to force a withdrawal.¹ Likewise, the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia were stubbornly determined to keep the door of negotiation with Saddam closed, either of their own volition or as a result of United States pressure. What they sought was Iraq's unconditional capitulation.

Arafat should have known better. Never in the modern history of inter-Arab relations had the line been drawn so clearly between two opposing camps—in this case the anti-Saddam camp and the camp of those who chose to stay outside it. Sitting on the fence was not allowed, nor was neutrality.

DID SADDAM NEED ARAFAT?



What about the charge that Arafat's behavior strengthened Saddam's resolve and legitimized his claims? The rulers of the Gulf countries certainly believed this.² However, in many political affairs reality is what we believe in and not what is there; it is hard to believe that Saddam needed an Arafat to harden his position or to give his actions a cloak of legitimacy.

From the beginning, Saddam was driven by his own vision. He was in full control of the Iraqi state, which is what mattered most in his search for legitimacy. Saddam was unyielding and determined to turn his back on anyone who suggested withdrawal from Kuwait. According to a senior Arab official, Saddam told Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh that he would not be welcome in Baghdad if he recommended an Iraqi withdrawal because that would run counter to Iraq's nationalist stand. When Arafat reportedly implored Saddam to

¹White Paper on Jordan and the Gulf Crisis, August 1990–March 1991 (Amman: The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1991), pp. 4–5.

²Senior diplomats from the Gulf have often expressed their belief in this charge in discussions with the author.

Four Decades: How the Map Has Changed



withdraw from Kuwait, pointing to the destruction that awaited Iraq if it did not, Saddam replied that if the Palestinians, with their limited military resources, were able to hold out for 88 days against the Israeli forces during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, then Iraq, with its greater military resources, should be able to stand fast for a much longer time. These exchanges illustrate Saddam's frame of mind.

Throughout the crisis, Arafat's worst mistake was to follow rather than lead Palestinian public opinion. The PLO leader should have taken a stand against Palestinian popular opinion and supported the Kuwaiti position.

THE REACTIVE TREND

The Gulf war and its aftermath catalyzed a heated debate among Palestinians that resulted in demands for political and organizational changes in the PLO. At the same time, the PLO's grip on Palestinian politics began to loosen. Two trends in Palestinian political thought developed: a reactive and a proactive policy.

Those advocating a reactive policy believed that because of the PLO's weak position after the Gulf war, it should refrain from any bold initiatives. Instead, the group should adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and simply react to initiatives from the United States or others. The first important initiative they faced was a United States proposal for a Middle East peace conference under joint Soviet-American sponsorship. To strengthen the PLO's negotiating position at such a conference, advocates of

a reactive approach argued that the PLO should restore its prewar Arab alliances and reinvigorate its 1988 peace strategy, which was based on recognition of Israel, acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and creation of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan and confined to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza.* Among the policy's chief advocates were Arafat, PLO Executive Committee members Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin), Yasir Abd Rabbuh, Suleiman al-Najjab, and Faruq al-Qaddumi.

The PLO's efforts to seek reconciliation and a return to the Arab mainstream were evident in the organization's stepped-up effort to rebuild its bridges with Egypt and Syria. PLO efforts to improve relations with Egypt took the form of meetings between senior Egyptian and PLO officials on the proposed Middle East peace conference. Thanks to the mediation efforts of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a summit meeting took place between Arafat and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Benghazi, Libya, in August 1991. The meeting returned the Egyptian-Palestinian relationship to where it had been before the Gulf crisis, and restored the PLO's Arab credentials, which had been tarnished during the Gulf crisis. The visit also helped end Egypt's isolation and paved the way for its reintegration into the Arab and Islamic worlds after being condemned for signing a separate peace agreement with Israel in 1979.

The PLO was motivated to improve relations with the regime of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad after eight years of bitter feuding by three objectives: to use Damascus as a channel to the Gulf states; to thwart attempts by the United States and the Gulf governments to exclude the PLO from the Middle East peace process; and to coordinate with Syria a common stand before the Middle East peace conference.

The Syrian government, not the PLO, took the initiative in improving relations. The reason? Syria has a Camp David complex. It wanted to make sure that no

*Editor's note: UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, calls for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied during the June 1967 Six Day War (East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza Strip), and for Arab states to recognize Israel's "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries"—the so-called land for peace formula.

Arab state would reach a separate peace with Israel, or reach an agreement with it regarding functional issues, before Israel committed itself to withdraw from Arab land. Whatever working relationship emerges between Syria and the PLO on the tactical level will be temporary, since their long-term goals are different. The PLO wants a freeze on Jewish settlements, even if it entails a separate arrangement with Israel. Syria sees no incentive to move in that direction, since the Israeli government is adamantly opposed to territorial compromise on the Golan Heights.

An interest in reconciliation was also evident in the PLO's attitude toward the peace conference and in its reaction to the conditions laid down by the United States and Israel for participation in the conference. Since April 1991, the PLO had allowed a Palestinian delegation from the occupied territories to meet with United States Secretary of State James Baker 3d several times, despite Baker's opposition to a Palestinian state or any role for the PLO.³ That same month, the PLO Central Council recommended the "opening of new horizons" for restoring the dialogue with the United States. (The United States has made it clear that it is not yet ready to reopen its official dialogue with the PLO, which was broken off in 1990.)

In June, Arafat accepted American proposals regarding the participation of Palestinians from the occupied territories in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace conference, thus dropping his insistence on independent Palestinian representation; and in September the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, authorized Palestinian involvement in the peace conference. The PNC stopped short of sanctioning Palestinian participation on the basis of Israel's conditions, which were: any Palestinian delegation must be formed by non-PLO Palestinians from the occupied territories; members of the delegation would not have any direct connection with East Jerusalem; and members should not have formal links with the PLO.

THE PROACTIVE TREND

Two groups, one secular and the other Islamist, advocate a proactive policy for the PLO; that is, the organization should initiate new ideas and policies, and not simply react to outside initiatives. Representatives of the secular perspective include Palestinian intellectuals, dissenting Fatah insiders, and leftist groups. The Islamist perspective is represented by the Islamic Resistance Movement (often referred to by its Arabic acronym, Hamas) and Islamic Jihad.

³The most prominent members of the Palestinian delegation were Hanan Ashrawi, Zakaria al-Agha, Faisal al-Husseini, and Sari Nusseibeh.

⁴Walid Khalidi, *The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequence* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), pp. 22–23.

Certain Palestinian intellectuals criticized the PLO's position on the Gulf crisis on both moral and political grounds. They said the PLO's strategy during the crisis gravely damaged the organization's political credibility, and called on it to come out "publicly, repeatedly, and forcefully against the invasion of Kuwait and in favor of Iraqi withdrawal. . . ."⁴ Other intellectuals, while not supportive of the PLO's policy during the crisis, proposed alternative approaches for the Palestinian movement.

One of these approaches was based on the belief that a change in Palestinian politics was needed. The best way to accomplish this was to focus on how the United States could help promote lasting peace in the region. Those holding this view believed the Palestinians should obtain clarifications from the United States regarding its interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 and guarantees that a Middle East peace conference would produce a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli settlement. They also said the United States should provide written assurances that during the transitional phase Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank would cease, and that sovereignty over land, water, the economy, and other matters would be in Palestinian hands. Leading Palestinian representatives, including Faisal al-Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, repeatedly and consistently demanded such guarantees during their discussions with Secretary of State Baker.

Palestinian intellectuals wanted the PLO to play a role in selecting the Palestinian delegation to the conference. However, when it became clear that the United States and Israel adamantly rejected such a role, many intellectuals concluded that substance was more important than procedure, even if it meant accepting a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without PLO participation. Their position on this issue was in accordance with that of senior Fatah leaders, like Mahmoud Abbas, who argued that the PLO should allow the Palestinians living in the occupied territories to negotiate a settlement with Israel.

Palestinian political activists, both inside and outside the occupied territories, also joined the debate over alternatives. While all Palestinians have recognized the need for political reform, this time the call was voiced both inside and outside the PLO. Two proposals that have been developed stand out: internal reform and *marhaliyyah*, or the concept of stages in achieving a Palestinian state.

The ideas of Radi al-Jarai and Khalid al-Hasan on internal reform deserve special mention. Jarai is a senior Fatah activist in the West Bank who writes for the pro-Fatah Jerusalem daily *Al-Fajr*. In his articles, Jarai has proposed that PLO institutions should be composed of both Palestinians in the occupied territories and those living outside them. To achieve this, Jarai has suggested the dissolution of the PNC, internationally supervised elections for new PNC delegates, and a provisional gov-

ernment or government-in-exile composed of an equal number of Palestinians from inside and outside the occupied territories. The *intifada* leaders have expressed similar ideas.

Khalid al-Hasan, a founder of Fatah and the head of the PNC's Foreign Affairs Committee, has promoted ideas like Jarai's that have the support of an important segment of Palestinian opinion. Besides calling for democratization and an end to what he called the "tyrannical line of Arafat," Hasan strongly recommended that the Palestinians form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the peace conference and set up a provisional government.

An independent Palestinian delegation, Hasan argued, would be incapable of achieving results in bilateral negotiations, even if it was accepted by Israel, for four reasons. First, the diplomatic balance would be overwhelmingly against it; second, Security Council Resolution 242 does not apply to the PLO, but to the occupied territory and by implication to Jordan; third, if Jordan attended the conference alone—and it was willing to do that if it had to—it would discuss only Jordan, not Palestine; fourth, for an independent delegation the maximum bargaining position would be self-rule, while for a joint delegation it would be the exchange of land for peace.

In making these proposals, Hasan may have been motivated by a desire to challenge Arafat while Arafat was in a position of weakness. But regardless of his motive, his ideas on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation found support in the PLO and in the occupied territories.

The concept of *marhaliyyah* has also had a significant impact on Palestinian thinking. Since 1974 the Palestinians have demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state confederated with Jordan. In March 1991, the situation started to change. For the first time, some Palestinians in the occupied territories, notably Jarai, publicly advocated the idea of an interim phase before statehood. They dropped the word "autonomy" because it was associated with the restrictive interpretation of Israel's Likud government, which insisted that autonomy would apply to people but not to territory. Instead, Jarai and a few others used the term "self-government," or "self-governing arrangements," a phrase reportedly introduced by Baker and used in his letters of assurances to the Palestinians. Although the concept of *marhaliyyah* had stirred a heated debate among the Palestinians, a growing number of people, including senior PLO officials, concluded that it was in the interest of the Palestinians to accept an interim settlement.

The diminished regional stature of the PLO and the galloping pace of Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank have made *marhaliyyah* a painful but acceptable option for many Palestinians, including many PLO leaders. Indeed, in April 1991, the PLO authorized the Palestinian delegation negotiating with Baker about

participation in the peace conference to accept the idea of an interim phase without American or Israeli guarantees that the proposed phase would be followed by an independent Palestinian state.

THE ISLAMIST PERSPECTIVE

Hamas and Islamic Jihad are the two main advocates of an Islamist alternative for the Palestinian struggle. Hamas was established in late 1987 as the political and military arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that has traditionally emphasized the completion of social reform and religious and moral education before waging armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. The *intifada*, however, has caused the Muslim Brotherhood to switch its focus and adopt an activist strategy of popular struggle. This process has been accelerated by its young and increasingly militant constituency.

Islamic Jihad emerged in the early 1980s. It, too, has young and militant members, who are motivated by religious and nationalist beliefs and who demand immediate armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad are based in the occupied territories, but they have followers outside the territories. Hamas is the more popular group, claiming to represent one-third of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.

Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad maintain independent institutions and political and social programs, they neither challenge the PLO's legitimacy nor claim to be alternatives to the PLO. However, they have increased their constituencies at the expense of secular PLO groups, including Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Equally significant, their advocacy of armed struggle and militant Islamism rivals the PLO's moderate program, which calls for compromise and a peaceful settlement with Israel.

The key ideas propounded by Hamas shed light on the ethos and direction of the Islamist perspective. One of these is the organization's call for an escalation of the *intifada*. This means promoting armed struggle and resorting to more activist measures against the Israeli occupation, such as strikes and boycotts of Israeli products. Escalation underscores the mood of the Hamas constituency. Born and raised in the oppressive climate of the Israeli occupation and frustrated with a stagnant political process, Hamas sympathizers have concluded that militant activism is the only viable alternative. For these religious nationalists, the *intifada* is the Palestinians' only option. The PLO's policy of dialogue and non-violent resistance is considered futile.

Hamas also calls for the total liberation of Palestine. Its demand is expressed in Islamic concepts depicting the Palestinian struggle as the "battle of the Islamic *watan* [homeland] with all its potential, resources, and

civilization, against the Jews and their greed and machinations." To Hamas, participating in the peace process is nothing but a "sellout of Palestine and holy Jerusalem." In a world where the United States is the uncontested hegemon, according to Hamas, peace conferences are instruments designed to promote Israel's expansionist program and secure the capitulation of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Hamas calls for the formation of a new PNC through free UN-sponsored elections in the occupied territories. If elections cannot be held, Hamas argues, then as much as 40 percent of the 490 members of the PNC should be Hamas followers. While these demands may represent an interest in representative institutions, the more immediate and compelling objectives are more complex than that.

The call for elections signals the start of a more assertive challenge to the PLO for control of the Palestinian resistance movement. The Hamas leadership may have decided that the cards were now stacked against the Arafat leadership because of its pro-Saddam position. On this score, Hamas policy during the Gulf crisis proved more pragmatic and forward-looking than that of the PLO. True, Hamas equated the fight against foreign powers in the Gulf (which it called Crusaders) with the Palestinian fight against Zionism. But the thrust of its policy was balanced. Anxious not to alienate the pro-Saddam Palestinians, Hamas demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Gulf and Iraqi troops from Kuwait; it also affirmed the right of the Kuwaiti people to self-determination and the selection of the government of their choice.

The latter demand was made in part because of factors such as financial aid from Gulf countries, skepticism about Saddam Hussein's ability to liberate Palestine, and above all Hamas's belief that the future would be on its side if it distanced itself from Iraq. Thus, with more of an eye on the growing influence of the Gulf states than an ear for the pro-Saddam demonstrations on the Palestinian street, Hamas maintained its balanced position and in the process paid its dues to its Gulf benefactors. Several Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, quietly welcomed Hamas's position because they believed it would allow them to manipulate intra-Palestinian differences.

WHO HAS PREVAILED?

These were the basic lines of thought that emerged among the Palestinians after the Gulf war. Which one has prevailed? So far, the views of the proactive forces of pragmatic nationalism have carried the day. Their vision was reflected in the political program of the September 1991 twentieth PNC, as well as in the decision to accept the American-supported Israeli conditions for participation in the peace process. The PNC program was based on the following guidelines, all echoing the proposals of the proactive moderates. The guidelines show

that the PLO has changed its position on key strategic issues.

- *There should be an international peace conference.* This position has changed. The new PNC program clearly states that with the current balance of power and new regional and international developments, the Palestinians have no realistic choice but to join in the United States–Soviet-sponsored regional conference with Israel and the Arab states.
- *The PLO should be an equal partner.* This position has also changed. The program stipulates that the PLO has "the right to form the Palestinian delegation from within and outside the homeland, including Jerusalem," thus signaling that the PLO has dropped its insistence on the right to participate directly and visibly in the peace conference.
- *Any solution should allow for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza confederated with Jordan.* This demand is not mentioned even once in the new political program. At most, the program expresses the Palestinian desire to build future relations with Jordan "on the basis of a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Jordan."
- *Autonomy is not a viable option.* The PLO has also altered its position on this issue. The new PNC program explicitly endorses "provisional arrangements" that should include "the right of our people to sovereignty over land, water, natural resources, and all political and economic affairs." This means the PLO has accepted the spirit of the Camp David formula of autonomy, without necessarily endorsing the official Israeli interpretation of it as an interim phase, pending an agreement on the final status of the occupied Palestinian land.

Other concessions the PLO made before the Gulf crisis have been upheld. These included the abandonment of armed struggle, the espousal of diplomacy, and the acceptance of UN Resolution 242. These concessions were unacceptable to certain Palestinian groups, including the leftist PFLP and DFLP, the Islamists, and the Damascus-based Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF). For the last two groups, the concessions not only represented the abandonment of Palestinian national rights in all of Palestine, "from the river to the sea," but also an ignominious capitulation to Israeli hegemony. The PFLP and DFLP also wanted direct PLO participation in the peace conference. They resented the formation of a Palestinian delegation on the basis of Israeli conditions.

SELECTING CONFERENCE DELEGATES

In his behind-the-scenes involvement in the selection of the delegation to the peace conference, Arafat used three criteria: family background, political affiliation, and geographic representation. An examination of the background of the members of the fourteen-member delegation indicates that they either were from high-status families or were political activists. Indeed, seven of the members either belonged to Fatah or were pro-Fatah, three were Communists, three were independents, and one was identified with the Abd Rabbuh faction of the DFLP; none was from the PFLP or the Islamist delegates, who chose not to participate. Three of the six members who comprise the advisory committee are from notable Jerusalem families with Fatah sympathies. In an attempt to represent the major Palestinian cities of the occupied territories, four of the delegates selected were from Gaza, three were from Nablus, three from Ramallah, two from Hebron, one from Bethlehem, and one from Jericho.

When the PLO Central Council met in mid-October 1991, Arafat had to face the daunting task of overcoming the stiff opposition not only of the non-Fatah elements but also of some mainstream Fatah veterans. A "palace coup" almost took place as the dissenting Fatah veterans argued that the PLO should reassert its rights against Tel Aviv and Washington, otherwise Palestinian independence and national rights would be sacrificed at the conference.

Many members of the opposition changed their views after reading an article by Bashir Barghuti, a leading Communist from the West Bank, that was published in the Jerusalem Arabic weekly *Al-Taliah*. Arafat read the article and realized that its simple but persuasive message had the potential to help the moderates overcome the opposition.

In the article, Barghuti raised three points. First, the Palestinian delegation, regardless of its composition, would attend the peace conference not to surrender but to fight for Palestinian rights; the conference would be an "arena of struggle." Second, those who had reservations should devise a viable alternative in the form of a realistic and precise strategic concept, with a clear definition of their aims and methods to achieve those aims. Third, Barghuti proposed the formation of a steering committee that would include Palestinians from inside and outside the occupied territories; the committee would be responsible for coordinating and giving

direction to the Palestinian negotiators at the conference.

Arafat distributed copies of the article to the 78 participants at the Central Council meeting. He eventually persuaded the majority of them to accept the composition of the delegation.

There is some concern that radicals may try to disrupt Palestinian participation in the peace process. The most serious threat comes from militant Islamists, who have publicly threatened members of the delegation. The best guarantee against the radicals is a genuine desire among all participants to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE NEW PALESTINIAN AGENDA

The emerging system of Palestinian politics is not likely to be based on the old formula of total PLO dominance or to be exclusively derived from the expanding role of Palestinian activists in the occupied territories. Instead, it will rest on interaction between Palestinians in the occupied territories and those living in exile. This is about to become a reality. The new Palestinian agenda articulated at the twentieth PNC reflects the political preference of the proactive elements inside the occupied territories. The official Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace conference was selected from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is supported by an advisory group composed of Palestinians from East Jerusalem and the diaspora. Together with the advisory group, the PLO will continue to unofficially co-manage the Palestinian delegation.

For the Palestinians, attending the peace conference represents an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity, since success at the conference could lead to their deliverance from the brutal realities of Israel's occupation. Indeed, the Palestinians have the strongest incentive to bring the conference to a successful conclusion because their very survival as a political community is at stake. The conference is also a challenge because the Palestinians believe they have made painful concessions on procedure; they hope for a better deal if and when agreements on interim self-government arrangements and the final status of the territories are reached. Their driving motivation is a compromise based on balance, fairness, and security for all. Faisal al-Husseini summed it up when he said, "We are fighting to free our people, not to enslave any other people. We are fighting to build our state, not to destroy any other state." ■

"The barricades that once divided Beirut are down, the fragmented country's almost two dozen fiefdoms have largely disappeared, and Lebanese and foreigners now travel through most areas in relative safety. Except for Hezbollah, the militias have largely disarmed. . . . Although these are important achievements, they have taken place against a bleak backdrop: Lebanon has lost what remained of its autonomy and has done so without healing the internal wounds that gave various foreign parties entrée to the country."

Lebanon: Into or Out of Oblivion?

BY RONALD D. MCLAURIN

Years of unrelenting warfare and successive atrocities were required to change the image of Lebanon as an island of peace and tolerance to something more closely akin to the pit of Hell. By the late 1980s "Lebanonization" had become the watchword for the national fragmentation worrying leaders from Africa to the Soviet Union. Ironically, it was during this same period that violence diminished in Lebanon and a "new republic" was announced.

Today, Lebanon is a transitional phenomenon, just as it was throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The current situation is the least violent in the last two decades, but it is certainly no more stable. Today's Lebanon cannot last, and the question is what direction the country will take.

The Lebanon that achieved sovereignty in 1943 boasted the roots of a civil government established in the 1920s in the early period of the French mandate and a political mythos stretching back to antiquity. The challenge for newly independent Lebanon lay in adapting its central institutions to change. But change requires at least some degree of national unity, felt or imposed.

Over the next 25 years, the Lebanese people—who at independence had been politically sedate and accustomed to rule by a few traditional leaders—became much more involved in the political process. The new elites generated by this process, however, were excluded from power, and the old elites, most notably in the Christian and Shiite communities, became increasingly less representative of their constituencies.

But by many of the traditional measures of instability, Lebanon looked less fragile than the vast majority of third world countries. Whether Lebanon could have surmounted its domestic difficulties if left to itself will never

be known, because the broader Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated them and led directly to the violence that broke out in Lebanon in 1975.

PALESTINIANS POLARIZE LEBANON

After the 1967 Six Day War, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) grew in popularity throughout the Middle East, including Lebanon. The political cost of restraining the Palestinians inside Lebanon grew markedly and resulted in a clear polarization within the country. Christians, who had earlier sympathized with the Palestinian cause, saw Palestinian raids against Israel from inside Lebanon as a mortal danger to the country since they knew the Israelis would probably retaliate; they believed that the Palestinians themselves were the gravest threat to national security. Muslims identified much more closely with the Palestinians; they faulted the Lebanese army's Maronite Christian leadership for taking action against the Palestinian Arabs rather than standing up to Israeli attacks.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Syrian government's intelligence network had sponsored Palestinian raids against Israel from Lebanon and Jordan. In 1969 the Syrian military supported the full-scale takeover of parts of Lebanon by armed Palestinian groups, leading to major clashes between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese army. But since the entire Arab world supported the Palestinians, the Lebanese government negotiated an agreement with the Palestinian guerrillas that gave them greater freedom.

From the beginning, the Palestinians did not intend to live by the terms of the agreement; the truce effectively allowed both sides to prepare for another round of fighting. That round took place in 1973, when once again the Arab world backed the Palestinians against the Lebanese government. Another agreement followed, but it was clear that Lebanon could no longer secure the south of the country, which had come under Palestinian control.

The clashes between Christian militias and Palestinian guerrillas in April 1975 were the initial sparks of a

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conflagration that would last for more than 15 years. The conflict over Lebanon's national and regional role slowly merged with problems that were exacerbated by the violence and dislocation—the concentration of national disbursements in the Beirut area, Shiite underrepresentation in the government, continued Maronite Christian control of certain key government offices, and the irreconcilable alliances of various Lebanese groups with foreign countries.

The interdependence of the internal and the international dimensions of fighting in Lebanon grew markedly from 1975 to 1990. As it increased, Lebanon's political, economic, social, psychological, and territorial autonomy—in other words, its sovereignty—diminished. The Palestinians were a major presence in the country from the outset of the fighting. The Syrians intervened in 1976 and have been there in the tens of thousands ever since. Israeli raids, invasions, and occupation are also a continuing ingredient. Every group in the country—including the national government—felt compelled to develop foreign connections to increase its political clout or to better defend itself. The Lebanon of 1990 consisted of more than 20 different enclaves, each dependent to some degree on its foreign ties.

But not all foreign powers were equally interested in Lebanon—or, more important, equally capable of exerting their influence. The two countries with a permanent interest in Lebanon are its two neighbors, Israel and Syria. After 1978 Israel took control of a swath of southern Lebanon equivalent to about eight percent of the country's total area. Syria was the dominant element in about two-thirds of Lebanon, but the extent of Syrian control varied greatly from time to time and place to place. Until October 1990 only the "Christian enclave," which included East Beirut and the areas north and east of the city, was free from foreign domination.

THE GOVERNMENT'S DISINTEGRATION

When Amin Gemayel's six-year presidential term ended on September 23, 1988, the Lebanese parliament could not agree on a successor. Syria insisted on its candidate, first Suleiman Franjeh and then Michel Daher, and could intimidate enough parliamentary deputies to block anyone else's election. The leadership of the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), the principal militia and political force in the enclave, controlled enough votes to block Daher. It proved impossible, even with outside mediation, to find common ground. Consequently, as his last presidential act, Gemayel, following a 1952 precedent, accepted the resignation of the government and named Lebanese army commander Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian, prime minister. Meanwhile, Salim al-Hoss, a Sunni Muslim who had been acting prime minister, refused to accept these presidential acts and insisted he was still the prime minister.

Lebanon no longer had a unified national government. Aoun acted as prime minister in the Christian enclave, al-

Hoss in the rest of Lebanon. This was merely the beginning of the complete unraveling of the Lebanese government. Soon both entities were issuing passports—and refusing to honor each other's. Questions were raised about the distribution of state funds.

As if this were not enough trauma for the Lebanese, Aoun commanded Lebanese army units loyal to him to attack elements of the LF in February 1989 to secure his position as sole leader of the enclave. The next month he had them turn their guns on Syrian forces in Lebanon, proclaiming what he called a "war of liberation." Aoun hoped his attacks on the Syrians would set off an uprising among Muslims against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Syrian military response, he wagered, would prompt international intervention compelling Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, thus establishing Aoun as a national hero, great liberator, and the next president.

Whatever Lebanese Christians and Muslims living in areas under Syrian domination thought of the Syrians, they were not about to take up arms against them. Few Lebanese had any doubts about what the Syrian reaction would be to such folly. When, in frustration, Aoun's guns were turned on civilian areas in Muslim West Beirut, much of the Sunnis' latent support for the general turned to anger. Cries arose in the international community over the heavy bombardment of the civilian areas, but these had little effect on the participants.

The crisis created by the death and destruction from the "war of liberation" moved the Arab League to take action, but the results were the opposite of Aoun's intentions. An Arab League committee bluntly blamed Syria for preventing a settlement. Damascus held firm. By the summer of 1989, the Arab League had arrived at a new approach that envisaged the convening of the Lebanese parliament outside Lebanon to discuss political reforms. Under the plan, the parliamentary session would lead directly to the election of a new president to fill the void created by the September 1988 electoral impasse. However, this last element was never publicly endorsed, since it created a strong disincentive for Aoun to cooperate; the Syrian veto over his presidential candidacy was still effective.

After several months of devastating shelling, Aoun and the Syrian government finally agreed to a cease-fire, the terms of which included a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia. Political leaders in Lebanon warned Aoun in advance that the meeting would necessarily reflect the balance of power on the ground, and that it would therefore be dangerous to allow the members of parliament to attend. Again, as in launching his war against Syria (when he disregarded warnings that he would not receive effective international support), Aoun proceeded, probably on the basis of the earlier encouragement he had received from various Arab governments and the sympathy for the Lebanese position that he sensed in Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and leaders of other key Arab League states.

THE TAIF AGREEMENTS

The members of parliament met in Taif in late 1989. Discussions focused on two themes: internal reforms and relations with Syria. After extensive negotiations, the deputies agreed on a package that reflected earlier efforts at reform. While some have argued that the changes constituted a major political transformation, they amounted to little more than tinkering with the existing system. They greatly weakened the symbolic power of the presidency, but institutions and practices in place for many years had already eliminated unilateral presidential action. (Virtually any action required, in addition to the president's signature, that of the prime minister and another minister.) Executive responsibility for the state was now definitely in the hands of the Cabinet.

The agreements' other reform altered the balance between Christians and Muslims from a ratio of 6:5 to parity in the parliament and throughout the government. The relative ease and speed with which the members of parliament came to terms—all were traditional political figures elected almost two decades before the talks—indicates the very unrevolutionary character of the changes.

The deputies also quickly agreed on a general approach to future relations with Syria. These ideas were sent to Damascus, where the government spelled out clearly to the Saudi interlocutor, Prince Saud al-Faisal, what Syria would and would not accept. The Syrian positions were entered as elements of the final agreements.

Having "settled" the Lebanese conflict, the deputies proceeded to mandate the holding of immediate presidential elections. Aoun was outraged. He had evidently assumed that any agreement reached at Taif would provide for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. Instead, the parliamentarians followed the script developed in the summer. The Taif agreements did not call for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, although they committed Syria to a redeployment of its forces in Lebanon over a two-year period following implementation of the reform program.¹ But this would still leave Syrian troops only about 20 miles from Beirut, at Dahr al-Baydar, and at other locations to be mutually agreed on, as well as in the eastern and northern parts of the country.

Aoun refused to recognize the Taif decisions. Before the parliament could elect a new president, he pronounced it dissolved and prevented it from convening in Beirut. However, the parliament met and elected René Moawad president. Less than three weeks later, Moawad was assassinated as he drove through West Beirut in a motorcade. Elias Hrawi was quickly elected to succeed him.

Throughout the period of competing governments in Lebanon, virtually every country in the world had tried not to take sides. Aoun attempted to exert pressure on key governments like that of the United States to alter their

posture, and in fact his supporters went so far as to surround, blockade, and threaten the United States diplomatic mission in Beirut, which thereupon withdrew from the city. By contrast Hrawi was speedily recognized by most governments as Lebanon's legal president. Rashly, he promised to crush the Aoun rebellion within 48 hours.

Meanwhile, Aoun had assumed the mantle of a resistance hero in the Christian enclave, and was silently admired by many Lebanese outside that small area. His anti-American rhetoric was now almost as vehement as his anti-Syrian tirades had been. He rejected compromise, fulminated against the new national accord, and insisted he was prepared to stand, fight, and die for Lebanese sovereignty and freedom. (However, when he was trying to reach an accommodation with Hrawi against the LF, he suggested that the Taif agreements needed only minor modifications.) His supporters intimidated opponents, pummeled vendors who refused to observe general strikes, threatened lukewarm political leaders, and humiliated the Maronite patriarch in his home by forcing him to kneel and kiss a portrait of Aoun.

Yet Aoun controlled only parts of the Christian enclave (including the presidential palace), while even larger areas were under the control of the LF. By the end of January 1990, Aoun was determined to seize complete control of the enclave. He demanded that the LF disband as a militia, and some of his units attacked LF positions. LF units counterattacked and quickly seized all army, navy, and air bases and equipment outside East Beirut and the Metn district north of the city. Heavy fighting ensued in the heart of densely populated East Beirut, a struggle more destructive than any the area had witnessed in the previous 15 years. Most of the fighting was over by March, but intermittent and inconclusive battles continued into the summer. At the end, two-thirds of the enclave was under LF control, and Aoun's forces were effectively cut off from the outside world.

AOUN'S OUSTER

By August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, more than nine months had passed since the Taif agreements. There was widespread concern that the reform package and the new government itself might simply disintegrate through irrelevance. Aoun was still in place. The governments that had backed Taif were now increasingly looking to Syria as the only party that could "save" the agreements. Syria's decision to participate in the international coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait provided Syria with the "green light" Damascus had sought in Lebanon.

On October 13, 1990, Syrian forces operating under the cover of the Lebanese army attacked the presidential palace and the surrounding positions of Aoun's forces. The general had already sought refuge in the French ambassador's residence, and his soldiers quickly surrendered. The rebellion was over.

The Taif accords envisaged the speedy disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, and most militias had readily com-

¹Syria reportedly gave the Saudis a written commitment to withdraw from Lebanon at some future date.

plied. The largest and most powerful militia, the LF, negotiated a gradual withdrawal from its positions in East Beirut and then the discarding of its major weapons. However, the Palestinians and the Iranian-supported Hezbollah demurred. A Lebanese army offensive forced the PLO to cooperate and accept the accords. Hezbollah is a special problem, since it is the principal resistance to Israeli occupation in the south. But the more accurate explanation for why Hezbollah has not disarmed is that Iran does not want it to and Syria is not prepared to fight its Iranian ally on this matter.

Foreign leaders and the Lebanese government itself have been eager to point to the "enormous strides" Lebanon has made since October 1990. Certainly, the security situation has improved. The barricades that once divided Beirut are down, the fragmented country's almost two dozen fiefdoms have largely disappeared, and Lebanese and foreigners now travel through most areas in relative safety. Except for Hezbollah, the militias have largely disarmed. The ports, highways, and the Beirut airport are open under government supervision. Customs duties once again flow to the government rather than to the private militias that previously controlled most legal and illegal ports.

Although these are important achievements, they have taken place against a bleak backdrop: Lebanon has lost what remained of its autonomy and has done so without healing the internal wounds that gave various foreign parties entrée to the country.²

PORTRAIT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT

The Taif reforms did not address the issue that underlies the internal crisis in Lebanon—providing political participation for the Shia commensurate with their numbers without threatening the interests of the Sunni and Druse communities, and doing so without generating Christian fears of being overwhelmed. Taif did little for the Shia or the Druse; it strengthened the Sunnis, who were in the weakest position; and it removed the Christians' principal remaining security, their veto power, when it weakened the presidency. The Taif agreements were actually subversive of real reform, destructive of government effectiveness, and contrary to the real distribution of power in Lebanon.³ Little wonder that they remained a dead letter for a year.

Only an outside force could implement Taif. This is precisely what has occurred. After Aoun's defeat in October 1990, Syria became the arbiter of all internal and external Lebanese affairs. The composition of a "national

unity government" was determined in Damascus, not Beirut. Syria approved appointees to the open seats in the newly expanded parliament. Pro-Syrian aspirants were named to key positions in the army, security services, and intelligence units. Syria made the final decision on all key political and diplomatic appointments. The sight of government ministers, businessmen, and political figures running back and forth to Damascus to plead their cases or receive their orders was the talk of Beirut and the embarrassment of the country.

At the end of 1990, a new government was formed. However, rather than representing groups and factions on the basis of either popular support or military power, the unwieldy and bitterly divided 30-man government manifested only one symptom of "unity": almost all members were subject to Syrian control. Many in Lebanon see this as little more than a "puppet government." It displays little interest in governing, ignoring the need to reestablish public utilities, stabilize the economy, and restart garbage collection, among other government functions. Worse, it set new records for corruption.

The charade of the "extension of government authority" over the country is vital for the Lebanese authorities and convenient for the other powers that have given up trying to help Lebanon. But it is readily apparent that it is a charade:

- Narcotics, primarily hashish and heroin, are grown in the Bekaa Valley and openly transported to ports, from which they are exported to Europe and the United States. The "government" will not interfere; some of its members profit directly, and others fear retribution from the Syrians and drug lords in third countries.
- Terrorist groups continue to operate from Lebanese soil, where their true sponsors can deny responsibility for them. Once again, the Bekaa Valley is the principal base.
- Even as the hostage problem was finally resolving itself in late 1991, the Lebanese government was not a prominent party to the resolution. Even though everyone knew the hostages were in the Bekaa Valley or the southern suburbs of Beirut, no one looked to the Lebanese government for action because it did not control its own territory. Instead, negotiations were conducted secretly but under the "cover" of the UN general secretary.

The Taif agreements provided a framework for bilateral relations with Syria. They also called for the promulgation of specific agreements on bilateral cooperation in various fields. The new Lebanese government proceeded to "negotiate" these agreements with Syria: Syria drafted them and handed them to the Lebanese for appropriate

²A less negative assessment of the accords is contained in Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon After Taif: Is the Civil War Over?" *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991).

³This is somewhat misleading, since most militias still have access to large quantities of arms, and much of their personnel infrastructure remains intact.

action. A May 1991 "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination" was followed by an agreement on cooperation in the defense and security realms.

These new agreements offer a better portrait of Lebanon's current political status than the self-congratulatory remarks of its leaders. The accords established institutions that supersede, and in some cases violate, both the Lebanese constitution and the Taif agreements. Provisions of the security agreement opened the entire Lebanese security structure, from firefighters to intelligence agencies, to Syrian penetration. Even more revealing, the agreement authorized punishment for those, including journalists, who criticize or otherwise "threaten" Syrian interests. So much for Lebanon's historic liberties and much vaunted free press.

AN ECONOMY IN RETREAT

Through most of the years of the fighting in Lebanon, the economy remained remarkably strong. By 1987 it was in full retreat; the Lebanese pound, only a few years ago exchanged at a rate of about three pounds to the United States dollar, has now plummeted to around 1,000 pounds to the dollar. Poverty and even hunger are for the first time major problems. The economy is stagnant, and the façade of peace has not fooled the business community, which, after years of determined optimism and shattered hopes, is refusing to invest in the future. Exorbitant promises from foreign sources—and even more grandiose dreams about foreign grants—have remained unfulfilled.

Lebanon once served as the Middle East's principal entrepôt and banking center, a vital bridge between East and West, and many Lebanese believed it could readily resume that role after internal conflicts ended. However, Lebanon's infrastructure has been destroyed, its once-solid banking system is plagued with scandals, and its links to the outside world are largely severed. Many of its most talented citizens have left the country.

What Lebanon most clearly lacks—besides its sovereignty—is effective national leadership. Members of the government and most other national figures are either artifacts of the traditional feudal system or products of the 15-year domestic conflict. The latter depend no less than the former on narrow clienteles, and have been forced by an environment dominated by foreign powers to pursue policies just as exclusivist as those of their predecessors.

The Lebanese do not lack nationalist feelings, but many find it easier to work with outsiders against their internal rivals than to work with fellow Lebanese. After 15 years of conflict, many Lebanese are still more intensely aware of the short-term threat to personal inter-

ests posed by various groups than to the larger threat presented by the disappearance of Lebanon's sovereignty. Lebanon's neighbors have no enduring interest in advancing any of Lebanon's communities. As Lebanon's autonomy disappears, so do its protections and opportunities. For all the shortcomings of the Lebanese state in the past, even the most downtrodden citizen enjoyed much greater freedom than he does today in the south under Israeli control or in the north under Syrian control.

THE PEACE TALKS AND LEBANON'S FUTURE

Some hope that the Middle East peace talks that began in Madrid in late October will lead to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. However, none of the participants seriously believes that significant progress toward a general settlement will be made quickly.⁴ Until a settlement is reached, the de facto partition of Lebanon between Israel and Syria will continue. Israel may make Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon a sine qua non for the return of the Golan Heights; Israel and Syria could also reach more complete agreement on security arrangements inside Lebanon that would perpetuate their effective control over the country. Even if Syria agreed to leave Lebanon, it is almost inconceivable that it would do so without ensuring its absolute control of the Lebanese government. The current agreements between Beirut and Damascus are firm steps in this direction, providing the justification for direct Syrian military intervention at any time in the future.

The current travails of the Lebanese army are particularly ominous. The army, once controversial but always a focal point of national identity and nationalist feeling, is supported by all communities and could serve as a platform for rebuilding unity. But, like so much else in Lebanon, the appearance of army triumphs masks the reality of profound division and dissension. The army consists of several cliques of officers and units supporting different political figures and Syria at the expense of professional command and control. This process of politicization is being encouraged rather than discouraged by the national leadership through appointments, deployments, and orders.

Lebanon's current situation is clearly transitional. The government lacks legitimacy. The brutal realities of power are that Syria controls all of Lebanon north of Israel's self-proclaimed "security zone" in the south. The country may eventually be absorbed by Syria, or by both Israel and Syria. It is possible that a new Lebanese nationalism will be galvanized by the continuing assault on the country's identity and unity. The Lebanese may retain enough sense of identity in spite of their internecine battles and the country may emerge intact after the occupations are terminated. However, the gravest long-term threat to Lebanon's autonomy is surely the unwillingness of the Lebanese people to undertake a serious, sustained effort to overcome their differences and build the economic, social, and political foundations of a unified state. ■

⁴See Ronald D. McLaurin, "Hidden Agendas Amidst Opposing Objectives: The Newest Incarnation of the Middle East Peace Process," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 8, no. 2 (September–October 1991).

"The Madrid peace conference testified to the strength of Egyptian diplomacy and its sense of direction, and the Gulf crisis demonstrated the stabilizing role Egypt now plays in the Middle East. Cairo has become the focus of postwar diplomacy in the region."

Egypt's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis

BY ALI E. HILLAL DESSOUKI

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, put Egypt in a quandary. During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, Egypt had developed closer relations with Iraq. It allied itself with the Iraqis, and the more than 1 million Egyptian expatriate workers in Iraq had allowed the Iraqi government to devote the country's manpower to the war effort. The war catalyzed Iraqi–Egyptian cooperation on weapons programs; the most notable was the Condor 2 project, which was undertaken along with Argentina in the hope of developing a long-range ballistic missile.* Relations grew even closer in February 1989, when Egypt and Iraq joined with Jordan and Yemen to form the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), an organization designed to relax trade barriers among its four members.

But the warmer relationship between Egypt and Iraq was not without problems. At the ACC summit meeting in Amman, Jordan, in February 1990 and the Baghdad summit meeting in May of that year, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein took different positions on several issues, including Mubarak's plan to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. Saddam's militant anti–United States rhetoric and his concerted effort to bring the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under his influence also caused disagreement. The growing number of Egyptian corpses shipped back from Iraq was another contentious issue. The Egyptian opposition newspaper *Al-Wafd* claimed in 1989 and 1990 that demobilized Iraqi soldiers were killing Egyptians. The newspaper criticized Mubarak's

government for turning a blind eye to the killings in the interest of maintaining good relations with Iraq.

When Hussein initiated the Persian Gulf crisis in July 1990 with his charges that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were responsible for depressed world oil prices, Mubarak acted swiftly to try to defuse the situation. On July 19 his administration asked all parties to restrain themselves for the sake of Arab solidarity. The next day Mubarak met with Iraq's vice president, Ezza Ibrahim, and the minister of foreign affairs, Tariq Aziz. On July 24 he traveled to Baghdad, Kuwait City, and Riyadh in an attempt to arrange a meeting between Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE.

As soon as Mubarak left Baghdad, however, Aziz said that the meeting had dealt only with Iraqi–Egyptian relations. Still, on July 26 Mubarak's chief political adviser, Osama al-Baz, went to Baghdad and arranged a meeting between Iraq and Kuwait that was held on July 31 in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. At the meeting Iraq again said the dispute it had with Kuwait was a bilateral concern; observers from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which had helped arrange the meeting, were not allowed to attend. The next day Iraq invaded Kuwait.

POST-INVASION MANEUVERS

Egyptian leaders were shocked by the invasion. It seemed incredible that one Arab state had attacked another. Moreover, the invasion posed a potential threat to Egypt's economic and political interests in the Gulf. And it could not have come at a worse time for Egypt. Ten years of quiet diplomacy to reaffirm Arab solidarity were about to bear fruit. When Iraqi troops marched into Kuwait, the Egyptian government was hosting a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Preparations were under way to return the Arab League's headquarters to Cairo, and an Arab summit meeting was planned for November.

It was obvious that Egypt could not accept the consequences of the invasion. On August 3 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a carefully worded statement calling for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from

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*Editor's note: Egypt withdrew from the program after the invasion, and Argentina formally announced the program's end in April 1990.

Kuwait. Mubarak held meetings with the leaders of Jordan, Yemen, and the PLO; he also met with Kuwait's crown prince, Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, and United States Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. On August 6 he received a senior Iraqi delegation led by Vice President Ibrahim. Egyptian officials told the Iraqis that the Western powers, led by the United States, would not tolerate the occupation of Kuwait and that if Iraq did not withdraw war was inevitable—a war that would be disastrous for Iraq.

On August 8 Mubarak held his first post-invasion news conference. His remarks showed that he had reevaluated the Iraqi-Egyptian relationship and had concluded that Iraq's willingness to pursue closer relations had been designed to limit Egypt's ability to act. This was especially evident from Iraq's actions in the ACC. Mubarak recalled that Iraq had proposed that member states of the organization more closely coordinate their security policies, a proposal Egypt had resisted. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, he called for an emergency Arab summit meeting on August 10 in Cairo to find an Arab solution to the crisis; "otherwise," he noted, "a solution will be imposed on us from the outside."

In his opening speech at the summit meeting, Mubarak demanded that Arab leaders choose between "an effective Arab action" that would maintain Arab control of the crisis and "foreign intervention... over which we could exercise no control." The conference's inability to unanimously condemn the aggression and demand Iraq's withdrawal left Mubarak disillusioned.

The Arab states' indecision at the summit led Egypt to three conclusions. First, Arab leaders could not reach a consensus on how to deal with Iraq because some were intimidated by Iraq's propaganda and military power, others had colluded and possibly conspired with Saddam against Kuwait, and the rest wanted to wait to side with the winning team. Second, peaceful resolution to the crisis required Iraq's clear commitment to withdraw from Kuwait and restore its government. Third, the crisis had already become internationalized, and the lack of Arab consensus made outside intervention more likely. Thus Egypt decided to support the international effort to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

Egypt was an important member of the United States-led coalition that was formed to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. It provided approximately 35,000 troops to the coalition, the third-largest contingent after the American and British deployments. As part of the coalition effort, Egypt committed its troops to the defense of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Mubarak's decision to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia was a major change in policy. During his 10 years in office he had repeatedly assured the Egyptian people that the military would not take part in conflicts outside the country. With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, however, he believed that Egypt's vital interests were at stake.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR

On March 6, 1991, less than a week after the war ended, Egypt, Syria, and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council signed the Damascus declaration, in which they agreed to "work toward giving a new spirit to joint Arab action." Almost immediately there were problems in complying with the declaration. In May Mubarak ordered the withdrawal of Egyptian coalition forces from Kuwait, a move that indicated he had different views from the rest of the declaration's signers on future security arrangements for Kuwait and the Gulf states. Egyptian newspapers began to criticize harshly the Kuwaiti government's policies, and said that Kuwait had not shown gratitude to Egypt for its actions during the Gulf crisis. By June relations between the two countries were on a more even keel, and high-level consultations resumed. In October, Egyptian Prime Minister Atif Sidqi visited Kuwait and concluded several cooperation agreements.

Disagreements persist concerning the substance of the Damascus declaration. The Gulf states have various views on how to maintain regional security. The declaration has now been reworded; the signatories agree that individual Gulf states can call on Egypt and Syria for military assistance.

Mubarak's flurry of diplomatic activity did not end with the Damascus declaration. Egypt was instrumental in convening the Middle East peace conference, the first phase of which was held in Madrid from October 30 to November 1 under joint United States-Soviet sponsorship. Cairo was the site for many of the meetings that preceded the Madrid conference, including one between United States Secretary of State James Baker 3d and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin. Along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt also helped keep Syria involved in discussions on holding the conference and participating in it.

At the conference, Egypt's foreign minister, Amir Moussa, emphasized his country's commitment to peace. He said that Egypt would use its working relations with all parties, including Israel, to help bring about a resolution to the conflict in the region.

DOMESTIC POLITICS: STILL NOT MUCH OF A CONTEST

The government's pro-Kuwait position enjoyed across-the-board support from the Egyptian people. Public condemnation of the invasion was nearly unanimous, although most people did not feel much sympathy for "little Kuwait." A few dissenting voices were heard, most notably from the Socialist Labor party—an Islamic party—and some leftists, who believed that an American military presence in the Gulf was more "disastrous" than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. However, there were no major demonstrations against the government's policy.

Political life in Egypt remains characterized by the dominance of the ruling National Democratic party (NDP), which has been unable to make itself into a

credible political force, and the eight opposition parties. All of Egypt's political parties suffer from lack of organization and a coherent ideology. The opposition parties have been unwilling to compromise and have shown little talent for coalition politics. Ideological cleavages, historical legacies, and leadership rivalries have kept them from working together to challenge the NDP.

The judiciary, an independent and respected institution, has become the referee on many issues, including the establishment of new political parties. Applications for new parties are considered by a committee whose decisions are subject to judicial review. Since its establishment in 1977, the committee has not approved any new parties. It has only been through court verdicts overturning the committee's rejections that new parties have been formed. In 1991 the Supreme Constitutional Court approved three parties: the Young Egypt party, the Egyptian Green party, and the Unionist Democratic party. The court, however, confirmed the committee's decision not to allow the formation of a Nasserite party, saying the platform of the party contained authoritarian principles that were unconstitutional.

Integrating Islamist groups into the political process remains a problem. Between 1987 and 1990, the Muslim Brotherhood, which wants the country to adopt Islamic law, had approximately 50 members in parliament. Their boycott of the 1990 parliamentary elections and their opposition to the government during the Gulf war have now marginalized the Muslim Brotherhood, yet it remains the most influential of the Islamist groups.

Small militant Islamist groups, such as Jihad, have resorted to violence and have received the most media attention. In 1990 as many as 51 violent confrontations took place between militant Islamist groups and police. Last year militants clashed with police several times. The violence remains limited and under government control, but Mubarak must work to involve the Islamist groups in the political process.

What is the balance sheet for the democratization process in Egypt? On the positive side, there is a liberal tradition, a strong sense of national identity, and a complex civil society. Another positive is a middle class that has been the primary source of Egypt's political elite since 1952. This middle class has increasingly organized itself into a large network of business associations, trade unions, and professional syndicates that have contributed to consensus-building outside the political process.

But several problems confront the advancement of democracy in Egypt. Along with its liberal tradition, Egypt has a tradition of authoritarianism. The ruling elite has grown up with and worked inside a single-party system. Most parties, including those in the opposition, are not internally democratic. And many parties have exhibited the disturbing trend of adopting ideologies that are incompatible with democracy.

REJOINING THE ARAB COMMUNITY

Egypt emerges from the Gulf war with little damage. Economically, the war's impact was mixed. Official estimates place Egypt's war-related economic losses at \$9 billion, including lost hard-currency revenues from overseas remittances, Suez Canal tolls, and tourism. The figure also includes funds the government will have to spend to create jobs for the 600,000 Egyptians who have returned from Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. Another \$10 billion in cash and bank deposits held by Egyptians in Iraq and Kuwait was lost.

Since the war Egypt has received large infusions of economic aid, but the most important assistance has been the reduction in foreign debt, which at the end of the war stood at \$25 billion. In recognition of Egypt's role in the coalition, United States President George Bush asked the United States Congress in September 1990 to forgive Egypt's \$6.5-billion debt for military equipment bought from the United States; that debt alone had cost the Egyptian government \$700 million in interest annually. The Gulf states also forgave Egypt's debts, and other creditor nations followed suit last May when they reduced Egypt's \$20.2-billion government-to-government debt by half.

After the war ended, the government felt politically secure and self-confident. It had allied itself with the winning side and had proved its worth in the process. The Arab League returned, as scheduled, to Cairo, and an Egyptian, Esmat Abdul Meguid, was elected its secretary general.

It is amazing that Egypt has been accepted back into the Arab community such a short time after being shunned for signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. The Madrid peace conference testified to the strength of Egyptian diplomacy and its sense of direction, and the Gulf crisis demonstrated the stabilizing role Egypt now plays in the Middle East. Cairo has become the focus of postwar diplomacy in the region. ■

"Ironically, the most significant impact of the Persian Gulf war may have been. . . that the 'wall of fear' separating citizens from autocratic rulers has been broken through. If this is true, United States President George Bush and his colleagues in the anti-Iraq coalition may have unleashed whirlwinds of change that will engender profound instability in the Arab world. While the great powers applaud participation and exalt democracy, they loathe instability; yet the achievement of greater participation and democratization without accompanying instability is difficult to imagine."

Breaking through the Wall of Fear in the Arab World

BY AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

Democracy's appeal is growing in nearly every corner of the world. Yet there is a tendency to presume that Arab societies are insulated from the global trend toward democratization. The very idea of democracy in Arab countries strikes some as laughable; certainly there is no widespread tradition of democracy in the Arab world. But putting aside the prejudice that underpins some of the commentary, part of the unwillingness to believe in the possibility of democracy in the Arab world is simple ignorance of recent political developments in the Arab states.

In 1984 one of America's leading political scientists wrote that "with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached."¹ Since then democracy has blossomed in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The democratic changes in these regions should chasten any rush to pronounce on prospects in Arab lands, especially when one considers the historical novelty of the democratic ideal in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union, where democracy's roots are neither thick nor deep.

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¹Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 218.

This is not to argue that all the Arab states will metamorphose into democracies overnight, or even that some will. As in Europe, a few autocratic regimes will cling to power while others will experiment with opening up government, permitting free or semi-free elections and sharing or pretending to share power.

As elsewhere, the global revolution in communications has had a striking impact in the Middle East. Governments can no longer hide behind a cloak of secrecy. Through reliable alternative news sources such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio Monte Carlo, and sometimes the Cable News Network (CNN), the man and the woman in the street have access to information about their government and the rest of the world. Coupled with education—literacy rates among Arab adults have steadily risen—the communications revolution gives people an unprecedented ability to judge their governments.

Opinions are now being publicly expressed in the Arab world. People are complaining about widespread corruption in government, insisting that leaders address their needs, and demanding a voice in decision making. But the opinions of Arab populations are not monolithic. They embrace diverse ideological perspectives, especially among Islamist groups in countries where a freer political life has encouraged competition rather than solidarity.

No conversion to Jeffersonian democracy is under way in the Arab world, but the pressure to open up political systems is increasingly obvious. For their part, many Arab politicians are pragmatic. In advocating increased political participation they are acknowledging the need to vent some of the public's dissatisfaction and relieve the pressure in their countries.

Faced with restive and increasingly assertive populations, some governments continue to choose repression over concession, but others experiment with democratization. Egypt is the most advanced fledgling democ-

racy in the Arab world. President Hosni Mubarak has pursued a mixed strategy of co-optation, sharing the blame as well as the benefits, and reasonably free elections engineered to ensure victory for the ruling National Democratic party (NDP). Both the secular Wafd party and the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the November 1990 parliamentary elections to protest anticipated vote-rigging and electoral procedures skewed to favor the ruling party. The NDP won an overwhelming but empty victory; not even the appearance of an effective parliamentary opposition was preserved (notwithstanding the six seats won by the left-wing Tagama party). Still, compared to the autocracy of former President Anwar el-Sadat and the intolerance of Gamal Abdel Nasser's presidency, Egypt is freer than it has ever been.

Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen are also moving in fits and starts down the path of democratization. The badly battered Lebanese democracy may be regaining its vitality, and incipient political liberalization has even been noted in Libya. Kuwait is an open question. The opposition there has demanded the reconvening of the freely elected parliament and the reestablishment of the 1962 constitution, both of which were suspended in 1986 by Kuwait's emir, Sheik Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah. Before Iraq's August 1990 invasion, the Kuwaiti regime had responded to opposition demands by holding out the possibility of citizen participation in a pliant political structure of its own making; thus in June 1990, the regime created an Advisory National Council rather than reconvene parliament.

As with earlier ventures into pseudo-participation by Nasser and Iran's Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlavi, the effect was simply to call attention to the absence of free political structures. After his return to liberated Kuwait, the emir attempted to dampen enthusiasm for the opposition and increase support for his family's rule by bribing virtually all Kuwaitis: he simply forgave all outstanding commercial loans and mortgages. The emir's many critics were quick to note the ease with which he dipped into the treasury to pay for the scheme. Whether he did more than provide them with ammunition against the regime will only become clear in October 1992, when the long-demanded parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held.

DWINDLING LEGITIMACY

Arab governments are widely viewed with disdain by their own citizens. While Americans routinely refer to "our government," an Arab rarely thinks in these terms. Instead, it is a matter of "us" and "them."

Insecure and marginally legitimate rulers regard any attempt to organize citizens outside the government's authority as a dangerous challenge. They view with the utmost suspicion any labor unions, professional organizations, civic clubs, interest groups, and other non-governmental organizations making up civil society that

are outside the direct control of the government.

In some settings, among the Palestinians, in Lebanon and Egypt, and in parts of Arab North Africa, civil society is vibrant and varied. In Algeria liberalization has promoted a flourishing civil society with more than 12,000 professional and cultural groups. But in most of the Arab world civil society is weak and fragmented, signifying the absence of freedom. In Iraq the government has aggressively destroyed any vestige of civil society that it cannot dominate, making it hard to imagine any peaceful transfer of power to a group outside the Baathist regime.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has often been exploited to justify the creation of garrison states in which freedom and prosperity are sacrificed in the interest of national security. Can a regime that lacks electoral approval and that roots its legitimacy in the confrontation with Israel, the "unity" of the Arab nation, and a commitment to justice for the Palestinians survive a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

This is a particularly relevant question for Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, whose dilemma became transparent in October 1991 at the Madrid Middle East peace conference, which was cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Syrian regime bases its legitimacy on its role as the militant standard-bearer of Arabism and self-appointed protector of Palestine. (Symptomatically, when the Syrians received \$2 billion from Saudi Arabia for their participation in the anti-Iraq alliance during the Persian Gulf war, they spent most of the money on missiles, despite critical domestic economic problems.)

Even as the Palestinian delegates in Madrid enthusiastically pursued negotiations with Israel, seizing what may be a last opportunity, the Syrians were reluctant to proceed. This was not merely tactical, but reflected their acknowledgment that steps toward normalizing relations with Israel necessarily undermine the regime's formula for legitimacy. Yet the Syrians could not afford to be left at the starting gate, especially given the world dominance held by the United States and the disastrous economic conditions in Syria that make further Saudi largesse essential. If the peace process moves forward, as now seems likely, the regime must try to refashion its claims to legitimacy.

THE ALGERIAN BELLWETHER

One of the most important and promising political experiments under way in the Arab world is in Algeria, where the National Liberation Front (FLN) has ruled since the country's independence from France in 1962. After bloody rioting in October 1988, when discontent stemming from unemployment and a general economic crisis erupted in Algeria's major cities, the constitution was revised to permit the creation of political parties in the formerly one-party republic. Nearly two dozen political parties were spawned, and municipal and provincial

parliamentary elections were held in June 1990. Several of the largest new opposition parties boycotted the elections, saying national elections should be held first. The boycott benefited the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which campaigned on the platform "Islam is the solution." The party won control of 32 of 48 provincial assemblies and more than half the 1,541 municipal councils. Even President Chadli Bendjedid's hometown voted for the FIS.

The FIS victory was stunning. The FLN remained in control of the national government, but its grip was tenuous. Bendjedid, who along with the powerful army leadership is apparently convinced that the political system must be opened up to survive, announced parliamentary elections for early 1991, then postponed them until June.

The old order will not go quietly. The present holders of power and privilege are attempting to manipulate the laws to preserve their power, and they may succeed. The Algerian parliament, still an FLN preserve, passed an election law on April 1 that proved gerrymandering is a universal craft. Capitalizing on the FLN's strength in rural districts, the new law created electoral districts that gave disproportionate weight to FLN strongholds. In the most egregious cases, pro-FLN voters in rural areas cast ballots that were effectively weighted to equal 10 FIS votes in the city. In addition, runoff procedures were modified so that only the top vote-winners could compete. This prevented voters from choosing a third party that might mark the middle ground between the FLN and the FIS.

The two leading figures in the FIS have split on some issues: Sheik Ali Abbasi al-Madani has espoused coexistence with other political parties while Ali Belhadj, a firebrand, has been outspoken in his skepticism about pluralism. Both men, however, blasted the new election law and urged their supporters to protest it. Demonstrations in late May prompted a declaration of martial law and the appointment of a new prime minister, Sid Ahmed Ghazali, who met with Madani in early June and promised "free and clean elections" by year's end.

Tension persisted. The army jailed hundreds of FIS members, and by the end of June both Madani and Belhadj had been arrested for plotting against the government. The two leaders remain in custody, though most of their followers have been released. The elections, which had already been postponed once, were eventually rescheduled for December 26. As many as 64 parties will compete in the December elections, if they are held. At least half a dozen of these will pose serious competition for the FIS.

Following the uproar in May and June, the Algerian

parliament had a chance to amend the election law but instead made it tougher. For instance, despite a request by Ghazali, procedures for absentee balloting that permit a man to vote for his wife were retained. The prime minister referred the matter to the Constitutional Council, the body empowered to overturn unconstitutional legislation. In early November the Constitutional Council invalidated the section of the electoral law authorizing absentee balloting; it said the right to vote is necessarily the right to cast a ballot secretly and personally.

Algeria has become a bellwether for the possibility of a genuine political opening in the Arab world, and the results of the proposed elections are likely to inspire imitation elsewhere. Whether the imitation will assume the form of a design for controlling dissent or a step toward pluralism remains to be seen.

SAUDI ARABIA: A REGRESSIVE CASE

While Algeria may be moving forward toward pluralism, albeit hesitantly, in other Arab states autocratic rulers are retrenching, tightening social controls after glimpses of a freer political life during the Gulf crisis. The most obvious example is Saudi Arabia.

In what is certainly the most socially conservative Arab state, middle-class professionals have long pressured the regime to allow popular participation in decision making. Since 1962 there have been periodic promises to establish a *majlis al-shura*, or consultative council; typically, the promise is dusted off during a moment of popular discontent, and then promptly put back on the shelf for a few more years. The latest such occurrence took place in November 1990, in the midst of the Gulf crisis and on the heels of promises by Kuwait's ruling family to restore parliamentary life in the emirate. However, one year later, in November 1991, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd announced that the council would finally be established, along with a written body of laws. Thus, nearly 30 years after it was first announced, the council may come into existence. But rather than being a precursor to parliamentary representation, as some Saudi liberals hope, the *majlis al-shura* will be a conservative body more likely to stifle than to instill change.

As the protector of the two holiest cities of Islam, King Fahd is especially sensitive to any charge that he is jeopardizing the sanctity or purity of Mecca and Medina. Although the learned men, or *ulema*, of the puritanical Wahhabi sect do not rule in Saudi Arabia, they are keenly concerned with the state of public morals and deeply influence the regime and the monarch; a challenge to the regime's Islamic probity is a challenge to its core legitimacy.* Hence King Fahd had to heed conservative grumbling over his agreement to permit the United States-led, predominantly non-Muslim military alliance against Iraq to deploy in the kingdom during the Gulf crisis.

*Editor's note: For a discussion of the Wahhabi influence on the Saudi regime, see David Long, "Stability in Saudi Arabia," *Current History*, January 1991, pp. 9-10.

When presented with an opportunity to emphasize his credentials as upholder of the faith during the Gulf crisis, the king seized it. On November 6, 1990, some four dozen Saudi women in Riyadh audaciously dismissed their drivers and drove their own cars, thus violating the informal but well-understood ban on women driving cars. Saudi liberals—who later petitioned the king to create a parliament and an independent judiciary, to reduce the power religion has on society and to review the status of women—were initially heartened by the demonstration.

The regime, however, reacted harshly, ostracizing the participants, firing several from their teaching positions, and exploiting the incident to stress the regime's Wahhabist credentials. A leading Wahhabi deliberative body lent support to the king with a *fatwa*, or authoritative religious opinion, that found that "women should not be allowed to drive motor vehicles as the *sharia* [religious law] instructs that things that degrade or harm the dignity of women must be prevented."²

Last June, in a move that was widely interpreted as an attempt by the *ulema* to collect for their wartime suffering of Western troops in the kingdom while countering the entreaties of Saudi liberals, the *ulema* presented a memorandum urging King Fahd to undertake a series of conservative reforms. These included the creation of an *ulema*-dominated parliament, stricter application of Islamic law in the country, and consistent punishments for corruption. Although the conservative reforms have not been implemented, there is little doubt that political life in Saudi Arabia will continue to be the exclusive preserve of the regime, not its citizens.

THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

In recent years, Islamist movements in the Arab world have proliferated dramatically. Enjoying broad popular appeal that crosses economic classes and employing a populist theme—"The answer is Islam"—these movements have been remarkably successful in winning votes where there are contested elections. In 1989 Islamists captured 34 of 80 seats in the Jordanian parliament and managed to construct a working majority through an alliance with leftist representatives. As noted earlier, the FIS has changed the complexion of Algerian politics, and the venerable Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has competed successfully in two national elections since 1984. In Kuwait the Islamic Constitutional Movement is poised to play a leading role.

Several points need to be made about these movements. First, their vitality stems from the general impoverishment of civil society. Where civil society has been suppressed, Islamist groups have often prospered; in

effect, they have had the field to themselves. Religious institutions are a part of the cultural landscape of the Arab world, and the fundamental Islamic institution, the mosque, is a natural meeting place that is often reasonably free from government control. As civil society is enlivened, it is only natural that the influence of the Islamist groups will be challenged.

Second, the Islamist groups are a symptom of the broad social and economic changes that have swept the region. Many of the people attracted to these groups have college educations but cannot find decent jobs, or have heard politicians' promises but have borne the brunt of government inefficiency. It is no accident that many of the Islamist groups have cemented their group solidarity by providing services that government either has not provided or has provided incompetently. Thus in many settings, such as Egypt and Lebanon, Islamist groups act as quasi-governmental social welfare and medical agencies, filling a vacuum left by government.

Third, in countries where the government has attempted to halt the rise of Islamist groups, there has been a marked solidarity among the various organizations. Where government has treaded more lightly, or at least more selectively, there has been fissuring and competition. Examples of the latter include Algeria and Egypt, where Islamists willing to play by the government's rules have abandoned those unwilling to do so.

Fourth, when Islamist groups move from opposition to positions of public responsibility, they submit themselves to a more prosaic standard of evaluation. For instance, in the Algerian municipalities where they assumed authority, FIS officials often failed to deliver on their promises, and lost some support accordingly. It is one thing to castigate government for its incompetence and corruption, and another to collect the garbage efficiently.

Moreover, playing the game of politics has left the Islamists vulnerable to political exploitation, notably in Jordan. On New Year's Day 1991, Jordan's King Hussein oversaw the appointment of five members of the Muslim Brotherhood and two other Islamists to Cabinet posts, including the portfolios of education, social development, and religious affairs and education. The monarch's motive was to put a lid on the public temper, which was at a boil because of the Gulf crisis and its damaging economic effect on Jordan. Less than six months later, the Islamists had served their purpose, and the king dismissed the government, appointing as prime minister Tahir Masri, a moderate thought to be more congenial to the unfolding Middle East peace process. On June 9, a National Charter that endorsed a multi-party political system, freedom of the press, and equal rights for women was promulgated.

Fifth, although the Islamist groups see themselves as part of the world community of Muslims (the *umma*), they are willing to voice their demands within states. Some observers believe this is some sort of trick, but the

²See Eleanor Abdella Doumato, "Women and the Stability of Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Report*, July–August 1991, pp. 34–37.

evidence points in another direction—namely, to the Islamists' realistic acceptance of the existence of the state. Obviously, some Islamists reject pluralism and democracy, but many others do not.

Sixth, as during the Gulf crisis, when popular opinion in much of the Arab world often ran strongly against the United States-led alliance, Islamist leaders are forced into the difficult role of balancer between their benefactors (particularly Saudi Arabia) and their followers. In general they have displayed a noteworthy capacity for pragmatism.

As many of the preceding points illustrate, the Islamist movements are basically social reform movements. Yet they retain a keen interest in Jerusalem, the third-holiest city of Islam, and in the fate of Palestine as a part of the *dar-al-Islam* (roughly, the land of Islam). Of course, the Islamists do not have a corner on the market in dogmatic obstinacy—one need only look at Israel's secular Likud party to see that. The unfolding Middle East peace process will show how the Islamists respond to the necessity of a larger compromise.

THE 1991 WATERSHED

Commentary about the Gulf war has often noted that the events represented a watershed. In an age of instant news, when history plays out before our eyes, it is understandable that some are impatient to declare that the Middle East is back to business as usual since the Gulf war did not bring instant sweeping reform. But the history of the region teaches that watersheds become apparent over the long run. It is likely that the events of 1990 and 1991 represent a particularly rich watershed, one simultaneously marking important international changes and catalyzing inchoate political trends in the region, especially at the level of state-society relations.

Ironically, the most significant impact of the Persian Gulf war may have been, as one Arab scholar noted recently, that the "wall of fear" separating citizens from autocratic rulers has been broken through. If this is true, United States President George Bush and his colleagues in the anti-Iraq coalition may have unleashed whirlwinds of change that will engender profound instability in the Arab world. While the great powers applaud participation and exalt democracy, they loathe instability; yet the achievement of greater participation and democratization without accompanying instability is difficult

to imagine. And there is of course no necessary connection between popular (often populist) political voices and Western-style government; the contrary is often the case.

If Arab governments are exhibiting a new tolerance for contested elections, this is no guarantee that the election results will not be manipulated or that the polling will be fully fair. The international community must be willing to supervise elections in the Middle East. Relatively free elections have been conducted under international supervision in Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti. International supervision does not render an election result coup-proof, but it does inhibit tampering with the results. Certainly Kuwait and Lebanon would be obvious candidates in the Arab world. In the first instance, international supervision would reduce the regime's temptation to ignore or reverse the results. In the second, supervision would be a means of facilitating the relegitimation of the Lebanese parliament, which last stood for election in 1972, as well as of putting some distance between Lebanon and its overly intrusive neighbors, Israel and Syria.

Liberalization will sometimes exacerbate tensions rather than moderate them. But whatever their transitional excesses, democratizing governments must eventually balance arms budgets against social programs and address the demands of those to whom they are accountable. Aggressive wars are not easily launched in political systems in which leaders must win support for their policies through consultation and consensus-building. Dictators, by contrast, are not subject to these constraints.

One as yet unmeasurable result of the Gulf crisis is that many Arab intellectuals and policymakers now argue that malaise in the Arab world is a product of the lack of freedom there. This may well prove to be the war's most significant revelation. In the short run, loosening the grip of authoritarian regimes will be a messy process, and incrementally minded Western officials will resist encouraging an overly rapid liberalization of Arab politics. But statesmen with a longer view will appreciate that promoting liberalization is the key to preempting the emergence of absolute rulers like Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. And no matter what statesmen decide, the train of political liberalization seems to have left the station. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The Monument: Art, Vulgarly and Responsibility in Iraq

By Samir al-Khalil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 153pp., \$35.00, cloth; \$16.95, paper.

In central Baghdad rise two "victory arches" built to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's design. The arches incorporate four gigantic scimitars and Saddam's own forearms, 40 times life size and cast in bronze. This monumentally vulgar monument to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, according to the brilliant expatriate Iraqi writing here under the pseudonym Samir al-Khalil, is a key to Saddam's Iraq. Khalil's previous book, *Republic of Fear* (published in 1989, when Saddam's dictatorship concerned few Westerners), examined what Baath party populist politics has done over two decades to Iraqis' minds.

In *The Monument*, Khalil shows himself a subtle philosopher of art as well as of politics-as-art; he reveals how Saddam killed culture in his country and penetrates to the twisted heart of the Baathist kitsch "aesthetic" of violence and sentimental nationalism. In today's Iraq, Khalil says, "there is no longer any way of telling good art from bad, all art from kitsch, or what is right from what is wrong."

Will the Iraqi people eventually topple Saddam and his monuments? "Even if the tyrant were dead," warns Khalil, Iraqis must confront, not merely destroy, the evidence of their subjection to him if they want "to exit from his spell."

Alice H. G. Phillips

A History of the Arab Peoples

By Albert Hourani. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 551 pp., \$24.95.

Hourani is considered the dean of Arab scholars, and his new history of the Arab world is a testament to his knowledge. He skillfully takes the reader from the rise of Islam and the conquest of Arabia to the colonial intrigues that led to the modern Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hourani never lets his focus remain at the political level alone; his history is a masterful synthesis of Arab life, with discussions of the rise of cities, cultural and scientific achievements, and the organization of society. Those who want to understand the modern Arab world—and those who think they already do—should turn to Hourani's study.

William W. Finan Jr.

Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon

By Robert Fisk. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 679 pp., \$16.95, paper.

This morally outraged work examines embattled Lebanon from the human side of the conflict. Fisk spares none of the outside powers or domestic competitors in his charge that the Lebanese people and the Palestinians who share the country have been victimized and brutalized.

A correspondent for the British newspaper *The Independent*, Fisk has reported on Lebanon for 14 years; his book provides chilling recollections of the pivotal events that have shaped recent Lebanese history, including the 1982 Israeli invasion, the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the misguided and muddled American attempt in the mid-1980s to impose stability.

W. W. F.

Rising Tides in the Middle East: Beyond the Gulf Watershed

By Augustus Richard Norton and Muhammad Muslih. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1992. \$4.00, paper.

Did the Persian Gulf war do more than expel Iraq from Kuwait? Norton and Muslih contend that, beyond the new arrangement of power in the region, more momentous change has begun to spread throughout the Arab world: Arab people have begun to question the legitimacy of their mostly autocratic political systems, and have started to move toward opening up those systems. While the process is now inchoate, the authors argue that the seed of more democratic government has germinated.

W. W. F.

Syria and the Middle East Peace Process

By Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. 224 pp., \$16.95, paper.

The authors, both respected specialists on Syria, have put together a concise and well-thought-out review of why, as they put it, "there can be no comprehensive, lasting, or stable Middle East peace without a Syrian-Israeli peace." Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's domestic policies, which have brutally transformed Syria into a regional power, are examined, as are Syria's relations with other Middle East countries and the superpowers. An informative and useful work.

W. W. F. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

NOVEMBER 1991

INTERNATIONAL

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum

Nov. 14—After a 2-day meeting of the 15-country group, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says North Korea should be persuaded to stop developing nuclear weapons through “dialogue,” not pressure; US Secretary of State James Baker 3d, who also attended the forum, tells reporters that North Korea’s nuclear program is “the greatest threat” to the region’s stability.

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

(See *US, Legislation*)

European Community (EC)

(See also *US, Foreign Policy; Yugoslavia*)

Nov. 8—In Rome, EC foreign ministers impose economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, including the suspension of trade preferences, because of repeated violations of EC-mediated cease-fires in the civil war in Croatia.

Group of Seven

Nov. 21—Representatives of the Group of Seven industrial democracies, meeting in Moscow with delegates from the Soviet central government and 8 Soviet republics, agree to allow the Soviet Union to defer repayment of \$6 billion in loan principal—though not interest—contracted before January 1, 1991, but link the deferment to progress on economic reforms such as price decontrol and budget-deficit reduction.

International Terrorism

Nov. 14—After a 3-year joint US-British investigation, the US State Department announces the indictment of 2 alleged Libyan government intelligence agents in the 1988 explosion of a Pan American Airways jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270 people. US President George Bush says the Syrian government, which had been accused of involvement, “took a bum rap on this.”

Nov. 18—In Lebanon, Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian extremist Shiite Muslim guerrilla group, releases Terry Waite, a special envoy from the Archbishop of Canterbury who was kidnapped in January 1987 while negotiating the release of other Western hostages held in Lebanon. American Thomas Sutherland, who had been held prisoner since June 1985 by Islamic Holy War, another pro-Iranian group, is also freed.

Nov. 27—The US and British governments jointly demand that Libya surrender the 2 men indicted for the Lockerbie bombing and accept responsibility for the crime.

Middle East Peace Conference

Nov. 1—The initial phase of the US- and Soviet-sponsored conference in Madrid ends; at the conference, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation presented their positions.

Nov. 4—Conference participants hold 1 day of bilateral talks; Israeli and Palestinian delegates agree to begin negotiations soon on self-rule for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Syrian and Israeli negotiators meet publicly for the 1st time ever in direct talks.

Nov. 21—The US State Department issues invitations to the countries that attended the Madrid peace conference to resume negotiations in Washington, D.C., on December 4, since delegates have not agreed on a location for the 2d phase of talks.

Nov. 27—Israel tells the US that it cannot prepare for the proposed round of peace talks by December 4; it suggests a few days of meetings with all parties in Washington, D.C., beginning December 9, and then a move of the bilateral talks to the Middle East.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *US, Legislation*)

Open Skies Treaty

Nov. 5—At a conference in Vienna on the Open Skies treaty, the Soviet Union agrees to permit aerial inspections of its territory to monitor compliance with arms-control treaties; the Soviet Union had been the lone holdout among the 22 countries taking part in the negotiations.

Organization of American States (OAS)

Nov. 15—In Port-au-Prince, Haiti, members of an OAS delegation and the Haitian parliament announce the signing on November 13 of an agreement to hold talks to restore civilian government in Haiti; under the accord, an international mission sent by the OAS will oversee the restoration of democracy, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission will conduct an investigation of abuses before and after the September 30 military coup that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Nov. 22—Aristide and a delegation of members from the Haitian parliament begin talks in Cartagena, Colombia, under OAS mediation.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See also *Israel*)

Nov. 9—PLO officials announce that the organization will reopen its office in Damascus; the office has been closed since 1983, when Syria barred PLO chairman Yasir Arafat from the country.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Cambodia; Yugoslavia*)

Nov. 27—The Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution to send a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia, as the Serbs, Croats, and Yugoslav federal government have requested, if the recent cease-fire declared on November 23 holds.

Nov. 29—A unanimously adopted General Assembly committee resolution condemns General Tin U's military regime in Myanmar for not surrendering power to the National League for Democracy, which won 80% of the seats in parliament in free elections last year.

AFGHANISTAN

Nov. 4—In Rome, Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan, is stabbed but not seriously wounded; he has lived in exile there since his overthrow in 1973. The motive and identity of the assailant are unknown.

Nov. 15—In Moscow, representatives of the Soviet central government and the Afghan mujahideen agree that President Najibullah and his Soviet-supported regime should transfer power to an Islamic interim government until free elections are held; in a communiqué, the Soviet Foreign Ministry denounces the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

ARGENTINA

(See also *US, Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 2—*The New York Times* reports that on October 31, President Carlos Saúl Menem issued an executive decree deregulating the Argentine economy; the decree eliminates import and export quotas, disbands 10 government organizations that controlled important industries, and allows auto and pharmaceutical imports.

BELGIUM

Nov. 24—Results from today's parliamentary elections show that the ruling center-left coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and 2 other parties has won 120 seats in the 212-seat lower house to retain a narrow majority; the Vlaams Blok, a Flemish nationalist party that espouses racist policies, has won 12 seats, 10 more than it won in 1987 parliamentary elections.

BULGARIA

Nov. 8—Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov appoints Bulgaria's 1st non-Communist Cabinet in 47 years. The Cabinet is approved by the 240-member parliament, 128 to 90; the negative votes were cast by members of the former Communist party, now called the Socialist party.

CAMBODIA

Nov. 10—Diplomats and relief workers report that the Communist Khmer Rouge has violated the UN-mediated peace treaty it signed in October by hiding troops and weapons in preparation for the resumption of fighting.

The 1st contingent of a UN peacekeeping force arrives in Cambodia to oversee implementation of the October peace treaty.

Nov. 11—Special representative Charles Twining, Jr., arrives in Phnom Penh to reopen the US diplomatic mission; the US severed relations with Cambodia in 1975 after the Khmer Rouge took power.

Nov. 14—After 20 years in exile, Prince Norodom Sihanouk returns to Cambodia to serve as leader of the Supreme National Council (SNC), a coalition that will rule the country until elections are held in 1993.

Nov. 17—Son Sen, one of 2 Khmer Rouge representatives on the SNC, returns to Phnom Penh. Son Sen was the head of the Khmer Rouge army and secret police in the 1970s.

Nov. 20—The government declares Sihanouk president until elections are held.

Nov. 27—Shortly after returning to Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan is beaten by a mob; he and other Khmer Rouge officials are taken to the airport by security forces and fly to Bangkok.

Nov. 28—The Khmer Rouge says it will abide by the UN peace plan in spite of yesterday's attack.

CHINA

(See also *Intl, APEC Forum; US, Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 5—Vietnamese Communist party leader Do Muoi, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, and 3 other top Vietnamese officials arrive in Beijing for 5 days of talks with Chinese Communist party leader Jiang Zemin; the visit marks the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations after an 11-year rift.

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East Peace Conference*)

EL SALVADOR

Nov. 14—Shafik Handal, a leader of the guerrilla Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), announces in Mexico City that the group will suspend its "offensive actions" against the Salvadoran government on November 16; President Alfredo Cristiani says the army will take "corresponding unilateral measures."

HAITI

(See also *Intl, OAS; US, Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 28—Defying international pressure to reinstall Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president, Prime Minister Jean Jacques Honorat says new presidential elections will be held January 2. Aristide was ousted September 30 in a military coup.

IRAN

(See *US, Political Scandal*)

IRAQ

(See also *Kuwait*)

Nov. 13—President Saddam Hussein appoints his half-brother, Watban Ibrahim al-Hassan, interior minister; the post has been vacant since November 6, when the incumbent, Ali Hassan al-Majid, was named defense minister.

Nov. 15—*The New York Times* reports that Kurdish leaders have reached an agreement with the government that will partially end the government's blockade of Kurdish regions in return for the withdrawal of Kurdish guerrillas from several cities in northern Iraq.

IRELAND

Nov. 10—Prime Minister Charles Haughey survives a no-confidence motion in Parliament, 55 to 22; the motion was brought by members of his own party, Fianna Fail.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Peace Conference*)

Nov. 21—In anticipation of parliamentary elections in 1992, the Labor party adopts a new party platform that abandons the party's longstanding refusal to negotiate with the PLO; the new platform also recommends repeal of the 5-year-old law forbidding contact with the organization, asks for a 1-

year freeze on new settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and recognizes the "national rights" of Palestinians; the party still rejects the creation of a Palestinian state.

JAPAN

Nov. 5—The parliament formally votes to approve Kiichi Miyazawa as prime minister. He takes office and swears in a Cabinet that includes Michio Watanabe—an outspoken conservative—as deputy prime minister and foreign minister; others named to fill government posts include several people connected with the Recruit influence-peddling and stock scandal of 1988–1989.

Nov. 25—*The New York Times* reports that in 1992 the Japanese government will begin importing as much as 100 tons of plutonium, fabricated in Europe from spent Japanese nuclear waste, to fuel conventional nuclear power plants and fast-breeder reactors; the US has authority to approve or reject the security arrangements for the convoys transporting the shipments.

Nov. 26—The government agrees to ban deep-sea drift-net fishing by the end of 1992; 2 bills that would impose trade sanctions against countries allowing drift-net fishing are before the US Congress.

JORDAN

(See Intl, Middle East Peace Conference)

KENYA

Nov. 16—Riot police disperse several thousand protesters trying to join an opposition rally that had been banned by the government. Five opposition leaders, including former Vice President Oginga Odinga, are arrested; 7 were jailed yesterday.

Nov. 19—President Daniel arap Moi dismisses Interior Minister Nicholas Biwott after he is identified by a judicial inquiry as a prime suspect in the February 1990 murder of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko.

Nov. 26—Moi orders the arrest of Biwott and former head of national security Hezekiah Oyugi; both have been implicated in Ouko's murder. The president also suspends a separate public inquiry into the crime.

Meeting in Paris with Kenyan representatives, the US and 11 other donor governments say that they will seriously reduce aid to Kenya if Moi's regime fails within 6 months to cut government corruption, improve its human rights record, and institute economic reforms; Kenya receives about \$800 million in annual assistance.

KOREA, NORTH

(See also Intl, APEC Forum; Korea, South; US, Foreign Policy)

Nov. 25—The Foreign Ministry announces that North Korea will permit international inspections of its nuclear installations if the US allows inspectors to confirm that it is withdrawing American nuclear arms from South Korea; Pyongyang also says it will negotiate with South Korea on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also US, Foreign Policy)

Nov. 8—President Roh Tae Woo says South Korea will no longer store nuclear weapons on its soil and asks North Korea to abandon its plans to build nuclear weapons. The

US proposes a withdrawal of its nuclear arms from South Korea as part of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons announced by US President George Bush in September.

KUWAIT

Nov. 6—The last of 650 oil well fires is extinguished. Iraqi troops blew up the wells in February during their retreat from Kuwait at the end of the Persian Gulf war.

LEBANON

(See also Intl, International Terrorism; Middle East Peace Conference)

Nov. 8—A bomb explosion destroys the main building of the American University of Beirut; pro-Iranian Muslim fundamentalists are suspected of causing the blast; 1 person is killed and 8 are injured.

LIBYA

(See Intl, International Terrorism)

MADAGASCAR

Nov. 2—President Didier Ratsiraka agrees to share power with a transitional government made up of opposition members that will prepare for elections within 18 months; Alber Zafy, his main rival, is named head of the body that replaces Ratsiraka's Revolutionary Supreme Council.

MYANMAR

(See Intl, UN)

PAKISTAN

(See US, Foreign Policy)

PHILIPPINES

Nov. 2—Imelda Marcos, the widow of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos, returns to Manila after 5 years in Hawaii; she faces more than 60 criminal and civil charges, including tax fraud.

POLAND

Nov. 8—President Lech Walesa asks Bronislaw Geremek to form a government. Geremek's party, the Democratic Union, finished 1st in October elections, winning 12% of the seats in parliament.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See also US, Foreign Policy)

Nov. 18—*The New York Times* reports that on November 15 King Fahd announced changes in the Saudi government to take place by the end of the year; the changes include the introduction of a written legal code, greater local autonomy, and the formation of a *majlis al-shura*, or consultative council. The king also said he will expand the size and the defensive capabilities of the Saudi army.

SOMALIA

Nov. 16—After a 2-day battle, troops loyal to General Mohammed Farah Adeen oust Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed. Several hundred people were reportedly killed in the coup. Both the general and the ousted president belong to clans that are subgroups of the United Somali Congress, which overthrew Mohammed Siad Barre in January 1990.

Nov. 22—Fighting continues in Mogadishu between Aheed's and Mahdi's forces.

SOUTH AFRICA

Nov. 5—Several million black workers end a 2-day strike to protest a new value-added sales tax imposed by the government in September.

Nov. 8—In Welkom, 22 mineworkers are killed and 51 injured after fighting breaks out between supporters and opponents of a 2-day national mineworkers strike.

Nov. 11—After a 3d day of clashes the mine is closed; 29 miners were killed in today's violence.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, International Terrorism, Middle East Peace Conference, PLO; US, Foreign Policy*)

TOGO

Nov. 30—Reuters reports that rebel soldiers who support former President Gnassingbé Eyadéma have ended their 2-day siege of Prime Minister Joseph Koffigoh's office in Lomé; 25 people are reported killed and 100 injured in the attempt to oust the prime minister.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

(See also *Intl, Group of Seven, Middle East Peace Conference, Open Skies Treaty; Afghanistan; US, Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

Nov. 1—The Russian republic parliament approves republic president Boris Yeltsin's October 28 request for emergency powers to reform the economy. The reform package includes privatization, land reform, cuts in funding for military plants and obsolete factories, and an end to most wage and price controls. Yeltsin also assumes the post of republic prime minister.

Nov. 5—Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov imposes a coupon-rationing system for bread, butter, meat, and eggs; he hopes the system will stabilize prices before state subsidies and price controls end in early 1992.

Nov. 6—After the Ukrainian republic parliament approves it, the Ukraine signs an agreement establishing an economic community that was signed by 8 other Soviet republics on October 8. Moldova also signs the pact; Georgia and Azerbaijan still refuse to sign.

Nov. 9—Vadim Bakatin, the head of the Interrepublican Council for Security (MSB)—the security and intelligence agency formed to replace the KGB—says that the number of Soviet operatives working abroad should be decreased at least 50% because of budget cuts for external intelligence.

In Grözny, a city in the predominantly Muslim Checheno-Ingush region of the Russian republic, civilians and militiamen block efforts by Soviet soldiers to enforce an emergency rule that was decreed by Yeltsin yesterday; the month-long decree bans rallies and imposes a curfew on the region, which declared independence on November 2.

Dzhokar Dudayev, who was elected president of Chechen-Ingushetia in an election on October 27 that the Russian republic parliament considers illegal, calls on men to arm themselves and declares martial law.

Nov. 11—Voting 177 to 4, the Russian republic parliament overrides Yeltsin's November 8 emergency decree and urges him to negotiate with the leaders of Chechen-Ingushetia.

Nov. 14—Meeting in Novo-Ogaryevo, Russia, 7 of the 12 republics agree to work toward a confederated "Union of Sovereign States." The extent of the central government's authority has not yet been determined; the parliaments of all republics must ratify the agreement. The Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Moldova do not participate in the meeting.

Nov. 17—Yeltsin announces new measures that lift most central government controls over imports, exports, and foreign currency transactions in the Russian republic, and that will permit the ruble to float freely after January 1, 1992; he also proclaims republic control over oil and gold.

Nov. 19—Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned in December 1990, is reappointed foreign minister. Boris Pankin, who has held the post since the August coup, is made Soviet ambassador to Britain.

Eight of the 12 republics agree to assume responsibility for the central government's approximately \$80 billion in foreign debt; the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia decline to join in this commitment.

Nov. 20—President Mikhail Gorbachev asks the Soviet parliament for an emergency 3-month appropriation to cover central government expenses.

Nov. 25—At a meeting in Novo-Ogaryevo that Gorbachev had planned to be the signing of a new union treaty, the 7 republic leaders in attendance agree only to send the draft treaty to their parliaments for approval; the Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova do not attend the meeting.

Nov. 30—After meeting with Gorbachev and the head of the Soviet central bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, Yeltsin agrees to finance the central government's expenses and Soviet diplomatic missions abroad.

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

Great Britain

(See *Intl, International Terrorism; UK, Hong Kong*)

Hong Kong

Nov. 8—Hong Kong begins the forcible repatriation of Vietnamese refugees under an agreement with Vietnam that Britain signed last month.

UNITED STATES (US)

Administration

Nov. 15—Gail Wilensky, the federal official in charge of Medicare, announces a new schedule for Medicare payments intended to help equalize fees for general practitioners and medical specialists.

Nov. 19—Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater says a draft executive order, written by White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray and circulated yesterday, that would have banned the use of racial preferences in federal hiring, did not have presidential or Cabinet approval.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, APEC Forum, International Terrorism, Middle East Peace Conference; Cambodia; Japan; Kenya; Korea, North; Korea, South; Yugoslavia*)

Nov. 8—The Defense Department announces that Saudi Arabia will purchase 14 additional Patriot antimissile defense systems for \$3.3 billion; Congress must approve the sale.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS November Reports

	Change from previous period	Total
Merchandise Trade Deficit		
August, revised figures	+12.1%	\$6.5 billion
September	+ 4.4%	\$6.8 billion
Consumer Price Index		
October	+ 0.1%	137.4 points
Unemployment		
October	+ 0.1%	6.8% (8.5 million)
Leading Economic Indicators		
September	- 0.1%	145.4 points
Discount Rate		
November 6	- 0.5%	4.5%
<i>Lowest since January 1973</i>		
Prime Rate		
November 6	- 0.5%	7.5%
<i>Lowest since 1987</i>		
Dow Jones Industrial Average		
5th-largest point loss ever; largest since October 1989	-120.31 points	2,943.20 points
Consumer Confidence		
October	-19.2%	60.1 points
<i>Below levels during 1982 recession</i>		

Sources: Commerce and Labor Department reports; news reports.

Nov. 9—After meetings with EC officials at The Hague, Bush says the US will impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia similar to those the EC announced yesterday.

Nov. 14—In Washington, D.C., Argentine President Carlos Saúl Menem signs an investment-protection treaty with the US that protects against arbitrary confiscation of assets and places no limits on the repatriation of profits. In an address to a joint session of Congress, he says that his country is committed to a trading community embracing all of North and South America.

Nov. 17—On the 1st visit to China by a top US official since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Secretary of State James Baker 3d tells reporters in Beijing that China pledges to observe but not sign the Missile Technology Control Regime, which restricts exports of various classes of missiles, if the US lifts sanctions against 2 Chinese computer and satellite companies; he also says Chinese officials have promised not to sell M-11 short-range missiles to Pakistan and other countries and M-9 medium-range missiles to Syria, and have offered to provide a list of most of its estimated 800 jailed dissidents and their statuses.

Nov. 20—Agriculture Secretary Edward Madigan announces that the US will provide about \$1.5 billion in additional food assistance for the Soviet Union.

Nov. 21—In Seoul, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announces that planned US troop reductions in South Korea will be suspended indefinitely because of North Korea's continuing nuclear-weapons development program.

Nov. 25—The Bush administration orders a military task force to build an emergency refugee camp at the Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, US naval base for some 4,000 Haitians rescued at sea since the September 30 coup in Haiti; the US says the refugees do not qualify for political asylum. On November 19 a US district court judge in Miami suspended the forced repatriation of Haitians.

Nov. 26—The administration announces that trade talks with China aimed at curbing Chinese piracy of American patents, copyrights, and trademarks have failed and that for the 1st time the US will seek retaliatory trade restrictions because of nonprotection of intellectual property.

Labor and Industry

Nov. 15—The Justice Department announces the indictment of 2 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) officials, Agha Hasan Abedi and Swaleh Naqvi, and of Ghaith Pharaon, a major shareholder alleged to be the Luxembourg-based bank's front man in the US, on racketeering and fraud charges; the 2 BCCI officials were indicted 3 months ago in New York on similar counts.

Legislation

(See also Japan)

Nov. 4—Nearly 6 months after his nomination, and after extensive hearings, the Senate approves Deputy Director Robert Gates as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in a 64-31 vote; Gates was nominated for the post in 1987 but withdrew because of questions about his knowledge of the Iran-contra affair.

In a 324-98 vote, the House rejects a bill that would have revamped the banking industry, particularly by allowing banks to diversify into the insurance and securities businesses.

Nov. 13—Voting 253 to 177, the House passes a bill requiring employers of more than 50 to grant each worker up to 90 days of unpaid leave annually for family emergencies and to guarantee the worker a job on return; the Senate passed a similar bill last month.

Nov. 15—As part of a compromise on the extension of unemployment benefits, the Senate approves, 91 to 2, a \$5.3-billion bill that the House passed yesterday, 396 to 30; the bill would provide 6, 13, or 20 weeks of additional benefits beyond the standard 26 weeks, depending on the unemployment rate in a jobless person's state. President Bush signs the bill; he has vetoed 2 similar bills in the past year.

Nov. 18—Voting 329 to 82, the House approves a \$291-billion military appropriations bill that provides \$4.15 billion for the construction of a limited land-based antiballistic-missile defense, but no funds for additional B-2 bombers.

Nov. 19—Bush vetoes a \$204.9-billion appropriations bill for several departments that contains a measure striking down Health and Human Services Department rules prohibiting abortion counseling in federally funded clinics. The House, voting 276 to 156, falls 12 votes short in an attempted override of the veto. The Senate approved the compromise bill, 72 to 25, on November 7; the House had passed it by a 272-156 vote the day before.

- Nov. 20—By voice vote, the Senate confirms Acting Attorney General William Barr as attorney general.
- Nov. 21—Bush signs the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which makes it easier to sue for job discrimination, awards punitive damages, and for the 1st time guarantees a jury trial in such cases.
- Nov. 22—The Senate approves, 79 to 15, a \$291-billion defense program bill that basically eliminates future construction of B-2 bombers but provides funds for an antimissile defense system; the House approved a similar bill on November 18.
- Nov. 25—The Senate ratifies the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms-reduction treaty between NATO and 6 former Warsaw Pact countries and approves up to \$500 million to aid the Soviet central government and republics in dismantling nuclear and chemical weapons; the vote is 86 to 8.
- Nov. 27—At the 33-hour closing session of the 102d Congress, the House approves by voice vote a compromise bill that would provide more than \$70 billion in Treasury Department loans for the almost-depleted Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) fund that covers bank deposits; the Senate passes the bill, 68 to 15. The House also approves by voice vote another bill allocating \$25 billion and authorizing loans of up to \$35 billion for the savings and loan industry bailout, which has already cost the federal government \$80 billion. The Senate approves the same measure, 44 to 33.

Both houses approve a compromise 6-year, \$151-billion transportation bill authorizing \$119 billion for highways and \$31.5 billion for mass transit; the bill will give states more flexibility in how they spend the funds. The House vote is 372 to 47, and the vote in the Senate, 79 to 8.

Voting 205 to 203, the House approves a bill that would allow the death penalty for 50 additional crimes and would establish a 5-day waiting period for handgun purchases; the Senate kills the measure by threatening a filibuster.

The 2d session of the 102d Congress adjourns.

Political Scandal

- Nov. 15—A US Court of Appeals panel in Washington, D.C., reverses all 5 felony convictions of John Poindexter, the national security adviser under President Ronald Reagan, for withholding information from Congress in the Iran-contra affair; the judges say his immunized congressional testimony was unfairly used against him at his trial.

Also in Washington, a federal district court judge sentences former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams to 2 years probation; Abrams entered a plea bargain last month on misdemeanor charges of concealing information on the Iran-contra affair from Congress.

- Nov. 20—The Senate Select Committee on Ethics reprimands Senator Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) for improperly intervening with federal regulators on behalf of political contributor Charles Keating, Jr., in the "Keating Five" bank-failure scandal; 4 other senators involved in the affair received written rebukes in February.
- Nov. 26—A federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., indicts Duane Clarridge, former chief of the CIA's counterterrorism unit, on 7 criminal counts in the Iran-contra scandal; the jury alleges that Clarridge helped arrange an illegal missile shipment to Iran from Israel in 1985.

Science and Technology

- Nov. 24—The space shuttle *Atlantis* is launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida; it will release an Air Force satellite designed to provide early warning of a missile attack.

VIETNAM

(See *China*; *UK*, *Hong Kong*)

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Intl*, *EC*, *UN*; *US*, *Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 2—Serbian-backed federal army forces attack the Croatian town of Vukovar in the worst fighting since the most recent cease-fire was declared on October 19.
- Nov. 5—At The Hague, EC envoy Lord Carrington threatens to end EC peace efforts in Yugoslavia if the latest cease-fire is not respected.
- Nov. 6—For a 2d day, Croatian and Serbian forces trade artillery fire in Croatia; pro-Serbian forces bombard Dubrovnik.

Croatian president Franjo Tudjman asks the US to send the 6th Fleet to the Adriatic to blockade air and naval traffic and help end the fighting.

- Nov. 14—About 20,000 refugees leave Dubrovnik in an EC-sponsored evacuation. Fifty people have been killed in 5 days of fighting in the city; federal forces cut electricity and water supplies on October 1.

General Veljko Kadijevic, the federal defense minister, agrees to allow the deployment of a multinational peace-keeping force in Croatia.

- Nov. 17—The Croatian government concedes that Vukovar has fallen to Serbian and federal forces after a 3-month battle. Croatian authorities in Vukovar offer to surrender if the federal army guarantees the civilians still hiding in the town safe passage out.

- Nov. 23—Tudjman, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, and Kadijevic sign a cease-fire agreement in Geneva; the accord—the 13th—was brokered by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who is leading a UN mission, and Lord Carrington.


- Nov. 29—Serbian-backed federal army troops begin withdrawing from 2 barracks near Zagreb, Croatia. Sporadic fighting continues in and around Osijek in eastern Croatia.

ZAIRE

- Nov. 26—Protests break out in Kinshasa in reaction to President Mobutu Sese Seko's appointment yesterday of Nguza Karl-i-Bond to the prime ministership. Last month continuous violence and looting occurred after Mobutu withdrew his appointment of Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister.

ZAMBIA

- Nov. 1—Results of Zambia's 1st multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections in 19 years, held yesterday, show that Frederick Chiluba defeated Kenneth Kaunda with as much as 80% of the vote; Kaunda, who won about 15% of the vote, has been president of Zambia since the country achieved independence from Britain in 1964. Kaunda concedes defeat.
- Nov. 2—Chiluba is sworn into office. Final results show that his party won more than 100 of the 150 seats in the parliament.



COMING IN FEBRUARY IN CURRENT HISTORY: LATIN AMERICA

While attention has been focused elsewhere, Latin America has been quietly changing. The challenges of economic liberalization, narcotics trafficking, and militarism continue alongside the progress in political liberalization. But the cold war lingers in the region because of Cuba's adherence to Communism, and United States policies have lagged behind events. *Topics scheduled to be covered include:*

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